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ABSTRACT
This dissertation is composed by three essays in Empirical Industrial Organization.
They analyze different industries and utilize different types of data and method-
ologies, but they all fall under the umbrella of studying the behavior of firms and
markets through the use of empirical techniques and data-based approaches. The
first chapter, written in collaboration with Carlos Hurtado, investigates the pric-
ing strategies of gas stations in the United States. Retail gasoline markets feature
high cross-sectional price dispersion and asymmetric cycles in price dynamics, two
puzzling phenomena that have gone unrelated largely because the literature defines
price cycles at the market level. The aim of this chapter is to identify different
pricing strategies—indicated by cycling behavior—at the gas station level, measure
their consequences for price-level variability, and explore their determinants. We use
daily, station-level gas prices in the United States, and propose a new cycling indi-
cator that overcomes issues with the existing one. Our results uncover a high degree
of heterogeneity in pricing strategies within retail gasoline markets, even among gas
stations in close proximity, and regardless of the brand. We exploit this intra-market
variation in cycling behavior as an identification strategy, before unavailable, for
the estimation of a cycle-induced price gap of -3.43 cents. With respect to the rea-
sons that motivate cycling behavior, we rule out conventional forms of collusion and
show that some testable predictions of the theory of Edgeworth cycles do not hold.
We contribute to the explanation of cycling heterogeneity by showing the existence
of consumer sorting into different stations according to their strategy: non-cycling
stations attract inelastic consumers, while cycling stations attract price-sensitive,
search-intensive consumers.
ii
The second chapter is joint work with Jorge Lemus and Guillermo Marshall; it mea-
sures how the challenges of organizational disruption after a merger impact quality
provision, through the study of the case of airline mergers. Merger-induced efficien-
cies may enhance firm performance, but the challenges associated with organizational
consolidation may offset these gains. We use administrative data from the United
States airline industry to measure the quality added from a merger over time. We
leverage unique industry features to separate organizational from non-organizational
effects of a merger on quality provision. Organizational effects are found to cause
a long-lasting and significant reduction in the quality supplied by a merged firm.
Also, we find that merged firms may perform poorly relative to the merging firms’
pre-merger performance.
The third chapter, coauthored with Victoria Lacaze, proposes a methodology to
assess the impact of the introduction of a new product on market outcomes when
this new product possesses a novel attribute that does not exist in the market yet,
with an application in a food industry. We estimate the effect on market shares and
consumer surplus of the introduction of a Good Agricultural Practices (GAP)-labeled
product in the frozen fried potato (FFP) industry. We first estimate a model of
household demand in Mar del Plata, Argentina, using scanner data and demographic
information. We find that higher income individuals are more concerned about health
and nutrition, and that younger and lower-income consumers are more price-sensitive.
Then we postulate that a properly GAP-labeled FFP is available in the market, and
we assess its effect by using the estimated utility function and prior information
about consumers’ declared willingness to pay for sustainably produced potatoes.
Our results indicate that this would increase the combined market share of the inside
goods, and that potato processing companies could profitably pay farmers between
10% an 20% more for GAP potatoes—which are more costly to obtain—instead of
paying the same price than for conventional ones, which is the current practice. This
result emphasizes the importance of both agronomic aspects and farmers interests, as
well as consumers’ preferences, for the success of any strategy that seeks to introduce
a sustainable food product in the market.
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CHAPTER 1
PRICING STRATEGY HETEROGENEITY IN
RETAIL GASOLINE MARKETS
Joint with Carlos Hurtado
1.1 Introduction
The varying price of retail gasoline is in the psyche of American consumers. U.S.
households spend a non-negligible share of their incomes in gasoline and their demand
for it is very inelastic (Brons et al., 2008). Consumers are also exposed to gas
prices regardless of their purchases because gas stations post their prices publicly
for everyone to see, including the competition. One salient, well-documented feature
of retail gasoline markets is the high degree of cross-sectional price dispersion: a
price spotted for a gas station can differ sharply from another found just down the
block (see, e.g., Figure 1.8b). This affects market efficiency and impacts welfare,
as consumers have to allocate more resources to price-searching activities. Studies
that have attempted to identify the sources of price differentials across stations have
focused on variables such as market structure, firm characteristics, gasoline brand,
geographic differentiation, and market concentration (see, e.g., Eckert and West
(2004) and Hosken et al. (2008)). But much of this intra-market variation in prices
has gone unexplained even after controlling for all these determinants. In this paper,
we show that gas station heterogeneity in pricing strategies accounts for a significant
part of the price dispersion observed in retail gasoline markets.
The goal of this paper is to identify the existence of different pricing strategies
across firms within retail gasoline markets, measure its consequences for price-level
variability, and provide insights into the reasons behind the pricing strategy choices
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of gas stations. In order to detect types of strategies we inspect the price dynamic
patterns they produce. We distinguish between two different patterns, according
to the presence or absence of asymmetric price cycles. These type of cycles, where
rapid price spikes are followed by slow reductions (see, e.g., Figure 1.1), have only
been documented at the market level (Eckert, 2002; Noel, 2007a; Lewis, 2009); there
is no empirical evidence of firm heterogeneity—or lack thereof—in cycling behavior.
In this paper, we identify cycling and non-cycling pricing strategies at the station
level. We establish that both strategies coexist within markets, even for stations in
close proximity and regardless of brand or other station and location characteristics.
This heterogeneity seems to be explained by consumers sorting through gas stations
that attract different price sensitivities, and results in a significant price gap between
cyclers and non-cyclers.
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We use a rich data set of daily, station level gas prices in the continental U.S.
obtained from GasBuddy.com, a website that provides consumer-reported informa-
tion on gas prices. In order to recognize the presence of cycles, we construct an
indicator that exploits a definitional implication of the asymmetry by comparing the
steepness of increasing and decreasing cycle phases. The resulting classification of
dynamic price schedules is robust to several data situations often faced when study-
ing retail gasoline markets, including the presence of price trends and short sample
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periods. This new cycling indicator is a methodological contribution that improves
on the standard measure used in the literature, the median change in price, that is
based on the assumption that cycle asymmetry generates more periods with price
decreases than periods with increases. The median price change indicator cannot
identify cycles at the station level due to the large number of days were individual
stations do not change their prices. Furthermore, the implication of the asymmetry
it relies on may not hold if the decreasing stage of the cycles is under or overrepre-
sented (e.g., under the data circumstances mentioned above), in which case it leads
to misclassifications. Our new cycling indicator overcomes these drawbacks.
With our new cycling indicator, we classify the gas stations in our sample according
to their cycling or non-cycling strategies. Our results indicate that, even though
cycling stations are highly concentrated in the Midwest, several locations that have
been viewed as non-cycling based on aggregate market price dynamics actually have
remarkable concentrations of cyclers as well, most notably in Florida, Georgia, and
Texas. This challenges the presumption in the literature that market-level cycles
in the U.S. are exclusively a Midwestern phenomenon (Lewis, 2009; Doyle et al.,
2010; Zimmerman et al., 2013). More generally, although most firms in cycling
markets are cyclers and vice versa, both pricing strategies are to be found in any
type of market, sometimes coexisting yards away from each other. The station-level
heterogeneity in cycling behavior that we find contributes to the explanation of intra-
market price variability: controlling for the variables normally associated to price
levels in the literature, cycling gas stations charge 3.43 cents less than non-cycling
ones. Therefore, the pricing strategy arises as a newly-found significant determinant
of cross-sectional price dispersion.
To assess the reasons behind these cycles and the variability in cycling behavior,
we first revisit the validity of existing explanations of asymmetric cycles in retail
gasoline markets. The overwhelming majority of previous studies align with the
theory of Edgeworth cycles (Maskin and Tirole, 1988). This is one of the equilibria
of the authors’ duopoly model; it consists of a price war, in which firms undercut
each other until they reach marginal cost, followed by a relenting phase with firms
randomizing over whether or not to restore price and initiate a new cycle. It has been
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claimed that the theory does not offer testable predictions other than the asymmetric
price cycle pattern. However, the random strategies played in the attrition war phase
imply that it should not be possible to predict when firms leave the trough of the
cycle. We establish that the probability of a cycling station to be at the last day of
its cycle trough is highly concentrated on certain days of the week, undermining the
ability of the standard Edgeworth cycle model to explain the asymmetric price cycles
in retail gasoline markets. An alternative explanation of these cycles suggested by a
new strand of literature is that they are the result of collusive behavior, based on the
degree of coordination at the restoring stage (Byrne and de Ross, 2019; Foros and
Steen, 2013). An observable consequence of any conventional form of collusion would
be an increase in price level, but a convincing identification of the effect of cycles on
prices has eluded the literature due to the presence of observable and unobservable
confounders that cannot be controlled for when the cycles are defined at the market
level. In this paper, we exploit station-level variability in cycling behavior as an
identification strategy to estimate the cycle-induced price gap controlling for market-
level confounders. We find that cycling stations charge on average lower prices, which
provides evidence against conventional collusion hypotheses.
An explanation consistent with our data for the existence of cycling-behavior het-
erogeneity in equilibrium is a setting where different pricing strategies can coexist
because they serve different types of consumers. Cycling stations draw the attention
of search-intensive consumers with frequent and sizable price changes. By concen-
trating lower prices on a few forecastable days, they attract price-sensitive consumers
more willing to restrict their purchases to certain days of the week. In contrast, non-
cycling stations divide up the pricing space in a different way. They use loyalty
cards and cash discounts to target consumers that are willing to incur the hassles of
carrying station cards or cash, and charge much higher prices to those that are not.
Because of their low propensity to search, these consumers will also be attracted to
non-cycling stations’ fewer and milder changes in prices. We provide evidence of con-
sumers sorting themselves through gas stations according to the price schedule they
offer by constructing a proxy for the frequency of price reporting, directly related
to the level of search activity. Our results indicate that consumer search is indeed
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higher for cycling gas stations.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 1.2 reviews the related liter-
ature on retail gasoline markets, emphasizing our paper’s contributions. Section 1.3
describes the database used in this study. Section 1.4 introduces the cycling indicator
we construct to classify stations’ strategies, describes its properties, and compares it
to existing indicators. Section 1.5 provides an overview of the degree and nature of
the station-level cycling heterogeneity found within U.S. markets. In Section 1.6 we
reassess the validity of the reasons behind cycle asymmetry that have been suggested
by the literature and offer an explanation of strategy heterogeneity consistent with
our results. Section 1.7 concludes with a discussion of the contributions of this paper,
its limitations, and implications for public policy and future work.
1.2 Related literature
Our paper relates to previous research on gasoline retailing that focuses on cross-
sectional price dispersion and asymmetric retail price cycles, two well studied but
previously unlinked topics in the literature.1 Empirical work analyzing the determi-
nants of station price levels has mainly considered the effect of location characteristics
(e.g., station density), brand or contractual form, and station characteristics. The
findings on location concentration have been mixed: while several studies report a
negative relationship between price and station density (see, e.g., Barron et al. (2004)
and Eckert and West (2004) for markets in the U. S. and Canada, respectively), oth-
ers find no effect (e.g., Hosken et al. (2008) in Washington D.C.). Station amenities
or physical characteristics (such as the availability of car wash or service station)
have been found to have little effect (Eckert and West, 2004; Hosken et al., 2008).
It has also been shown that station level prices are significantly affected by brand
and vertical structure (Hosken et al., 2008). There is no previous work incorporating
the role of different pricing strategies in station-level price variability, which is the
1See Eckert (2013) and Noel (2016) for extensive surveys of the literature on retail gasoline
markets.
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contribution of this paper to the retail gasoline price dispersion literature.
Asymmetric price cycles in gasoline retailing were first documented by Allvine and
Patterson (1974) in some southern and western U.S. cities. Castanias and Johnson
(1993) were the first to notice the resemblance between these cycles and an ‘Edge-
worth cycle’ dynamic pricing equilibrium. Edgeworth cycles were proposed by Edge-
worth (1925) and later formalized by Maskin and Tirole (1988) as one of the possible
Markov perfect equilibria of their alternating price-setting duopoly model. In this
Edgeworth cycle equilibrium, firms engage in a price war undercutting each other
until the competitive price is reached; a relenting phase then starts where firms ran-
domize between setting marginal cost and restoring price—in which case the other
firm follows—to start a new cycle. Figure 1.2 displays the market-level price dy-
namics that are generated in this equilibrium; the similarity with the sawtooth-like
patterns observed in retail gasoline markets is evident. As a consequence, Edge-
worth cycles have been the theoretical foundation of the overwhelming majority of
empirical work that arose since the early 2000 on asymmetric price cycles in gasoline
retailing dynamics.2
Figure 1.2: Maskin and Tirole (1988)’s Edgeworth cycles.
Source: Maskin and Tirole (1988).
The main contribution of this literature has been to establish the existence of
2A few articles suggest extensions of the model to generate more testable predictions. Eckert
(2003) introduces firms of different sizes; Noel (2008) introduces different types of asymmetric
equilibria (cost shocks, product differentiation, capacity constraints) and adds a third firm.
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asymmetric cycles, independent of changes in costs, in retail gas prices.3 They have
now been documented in most large and many medium-sized cities in Canada (Eck-
ert, 2002; Noel, 2007b; Atkinson, 2009) and Australia (Wang, 2009) since the 1980s,
and in some European cities (Foros and Steen, 2013; Siekmann, 2017). In the United
States, the consensus is that these cycles reappeared in the 2000s only in several
Midwest markets (Lewis, 2009; Doyle et al., 2010; Zimmerman et al., 2013). They
have been shown to be more likely to emerge in markets with low (Eckert, 2003;
Noel, 2007a) or intermediate (Doyle et al., 2010) levels of concentration, as well
as those with a large number of certain type of small retailers (Noel, 2007a; Doyle
et al., 2010). Noel (2007a) shows how the length (found to be either monthly, weekly
(Lewis and Noel, 2011; Foros and Steen, 2013), or sometimes daily (Noel, 2007b))
and amplitude of the cycles are affected by market characteristics.
The main contributions of our paper are in the topics within this literature related
to individual station behavior, the effect of cycles on price levels, and the alternative
explanation of these cycles as the result of collusive behavior. Previous work using
station-level data focused on the analysis of price leadership and coordination (Noel,
2007b; Atkinson, 2009; Lewis, 2012), but there is no empirical evidence on the exis-
tence of cycling and non-cycling station-level behavior. The only paper that refers
to asymmetric cycles as a station level decision is Doyle et al. (2010), but they use
market-level data and several predictions of their model—which is an adaptation of
Edgeworth cycles—are inconsistent with our findings, as we will explain later.
Attempts to find an association between asymmetric cycles and price levels have
been mostly limited to cross-section comparisons between markets with and without
cycles (Noel, 2002; Doyle et al., 2010), although these papers warn against causal in-
terpretations. Zimmerman et al. (2013) propose a difference-in-differences approach
using the start of the Midwest cycles in 2000; the decreasing price associated with the
3Some papers relate this phenomenon with that of ‘rockets-and-feathers’, where retail gasoline
prices adjust faster to cost increases than they do to cost decreases. Eckert (2002) shows that the
speed of upstream prices passthrough depends upon the current position on the Edgeworth cycle.
Noel (2009) decomposes the asymmetry into a component explained by price response asymmetry
and a ‘pure’ Edgeworth cycle asymmetry. Lewis and Noel (2011) show that passthrough is faster
in cycling than in non-cycling cities.
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cycles, however, may be biased by confounding changes in market structure of those
cities (e.g., the expansion of some large independent chains). Noel (2015) exploits the
variability generated by a fire in a Canadian refinery that arguably made asymmetric
cycles in some markets halt, which led to increased prices; the external validity issues
associated with this natural experiment exercise indicates that this result needs to
be interpreted cautiously. A valid identification strategy for the estimation of the
effect of cycles on price levels would also be helpful to shed light on the claim that
these asymmetric cycles are collusive in nature. Byrne and de Ross (2019) and Foros
and Steen (2013) argue that the level of coordination in the synchronization of price
restorations is an indication of anti-competitive behavior in Perth (Australia) and
Norway, respectively.4 However, there is no evidence linking cycles to the expected
result of any traditional form of collusion on the price level, nor is there a valid and
general strategy available to identify it.
In summary, our paper primarily contributes to the literature with the identifica-
tion of asymmetric cycles at the station level. The intra-market variability found in
cycling behavior, in turn, provides the literature with a new identification strategy
for the cycle-induced price gap, which helps disentangle various collusion hypothe-
ses. Additionally, it contributes to the discussion of what explains cross-sectional
price-level variability in retail gasoline markets, by uncovering a novel determinant—
station’s cycling strategies.
1.3 Data
We use a novel database of daily regular gasoline prices at the station level in the
continental United States. We gathered these data from GasBuddy.com, a website
that provides information on gas prices reported by consumers through a smartphone
app. Consumers use this app to check prices at stations nearby and find good deals,
but they also have cash incentives to report or update prices as they spot them. The
4Both markets posses institutional features that may make the cycles in this cities different
in nature than those in North America, a price transparency program in Perth and recommended
prices in Norway.
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use of this type of consumer-reported data is not new in the academic research on
retail gas prices,5 although most previous work analyzes Canadian markets.
We retrieved these data every day at 10:00 pm during the 7-month period between
September 22, 2017 and April 22, 2018. For each day and gas station in our sample
we observe the latest price reported, how long ago it was reported (we keep only
prices reported in the last 24 hours), station location, station brand, and other
station features (convenience store, cash discounts, etc.). See Hurtado (2018) for an
extensive explanation of the database.
In our analysis, we work with gas stations that have prices reported for at least 100
(out of 213) days, to ensure that we correctly capture the patterns in their price dy-
namics. We further limit our sample to cities with a representative amount (at least
70%) of stations with more than 100 reports6 in order to be able to accurately char-
acterize competition at the market level. Our final database consists of 10,134,059
observations, from 58,618 gas stations in 313 metropolitan statistical areas (MSA).
1.4 A new cycling indicator
The first step in our analysis is to classify gas stations according to their pricing
strategy. We do so by inspecting the firm-level price dynamics that these strategies
produce; in particular, we determine whether or not a station engages in asymmetric
cycles. Figure 1.3 displays representative examples of the different types of price
dynamics at the station level. To tell them apart in our data, we need a measure
able to identify the presence of the distinctive sawtooth-like pattern in Figure 1.3b.
In this section, we develop such an indicator, discuss its properties and robustness,
and compare it with measures used in previous work.
We propose a cycling indicator that exploits a definitional implication of the cycle
asymmetry. In the presence of asymmetric price cycles, sharp price jumps are fol-
lowed by gradual decreases. As a consequence, the rate at which prices go up is faster
5See Atkinson (2008) for a description of the advantages and potential issues.
6This last restriction only reduces our sample size to be 80% of all stations with more than 100
observations.
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(b) Cycling gas station.
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than the rate at which they go down. We construct a measure of that discrepancy,
the Cycling Ratio, defined as the average change in increasing stages divided by (the






s × 1(t ∈ τ s+)
ΣTt=11(t ∈ τ s+)
ΣTt=1 |∆tps| × 1(t ∈ τ s−)
ΣTt=11(t ∈ τ s−)
(1.1)
where ∆tp
s = pst − pst−1, τ+ is the subset of dates in the sample at which station
s experienced an increasing-price stage, and τ− is the subset of dates at which the
station experienced a decreasing-price stage.7
A Cycling Ratio sufficiently larger than one indicates that prices go up signifi-
cantly faster than they go down, suggesting the presence of cycling behavior. In
order to minimize the use of an arbitrary threshold above which a gas station should
be considered a cycler, we augment this measure by combining it with another regu-
larity of asymmetric cycle patterns: the presence of sizable price jumps. Figure 1.4a
illustrates the strong positive correlation between cycle asymmetry, as measured by
the Cycling Ratio, and the size of the price increases, which we measure with the
average percent price increase. We classify most gas stations with a Cycling Ratio of
1.5 or higher as cyclers: for these, the price increases were on average more than 50%
faster than the decreases. For Cycling Ratios higher than 1.1 but lower than 1.5,
we demand more evidence of cycle asymmetry by requiring an average price jump
of at least 1% for the gas station to be classified as cycler.8 A graphical depiction
of the definition of our cycling indicator is provided in Figure 1.4b; the indicator
takes on a value of one for gas stations classified as cyclers according to the previous
description, and is zero otherwise. A more conservative approach is to only consider
cyclers those that have a Cycling Ratio greater than 1.5 and non-cyclers those with
a Cycling Ratio lesser or equal to 1 and percent price jump below 1%, discarding the
rest (Figure A.2). The Appendix contains robustness analyses were the results of
7See Figure A.1 for clarification of τ+ and τ− in the examples of Figure 1.3.
8We require a price jump of at least 0.3% for Cycling Ratios 1.5 or higher, mostly to correct
for measurement error.
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this paper are estimated using this restricted sample. In general, the patterns found
with this more stringent classification are even more pronounced than those in our
main analysis.
Figure 1.4: A new cycling indicator.
(a) Cycling Ratio and average price jump. (b) Cycling indicator definition.
Note. A point in these panels represent a gas station according to its combination of Cycling Ratio and average
percent increase in price (price jump). For the purposes of illustration, only gas stations in Chicago are displayed.
The Cycling Ratio constructed to measure cycle asymmetry is robust to the differ-
ent realities usually found when analyzing gasoline price data. To illustrate, Figure
1.5 displays some simplified examples used to evaluate the accuracy of the Cycling
Ratio in the presence of price trends and short data periods. The price dynamics in
Figures 1.5a, 1.5b, and 1.5c come from the same asymmetric cycling data process,
but represent different contexts of analysis: upward trends in Figure 1.5b and short-
period data availability in Figure 1.5c. Regardless of those differences, however, the
average (i.e., per period) price increase is always $0.4 and the average price decrease
is always -$0.2, resulting in a Cycling Ratio of 2 that reflects the asymmetry of these
cycles. In Figure 1.5d a non-cycling dynamic pattern is shown, with average price
increases of $0.1 and average price decreases of -$0.1 for a Cycling Ratio of 1. The
presence of a downward trend in Figure 1.5d did not prevent the Cycling Ratio from
correctly identifying the absence of asymmetric cycles.
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Figure 1.5: Indicators’ performance with price trends or short data span.
(a) No trend. (b) Increasing trend.
(c) Short data span. (d) Decreasing trend.
Note. The Cycling Ratio is robust to the presence of price trends and short data periods: it equals 2 for panels (a),
(b), and (c) regardless of those circumstances because the patterns come from the same asymmetric-cycling data
process. If the decreasing phase of the cycles is under of overrepresented, the median price change can falsely reject
(panels (b) and (c)) or falsely confirm (panel (d)) the presence of asymmetric cycles.
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To conclude this section, we compare the performance of our new cycling indicator
with the standard indicator used in the literature, the median change in price. Lewis
(2009) used for the first time the median daily change in a city average price as a
proxy for the extent of asymmetric price cycles. The measure reflects the following
rationale: with cycle asymmetry, there would be more periods when the price de-
creases than periods when it increases, and then the median first difference of the
price would be negative. This indicator has been extensively used in the literature
ever since to identify cycling cities (Lewis, 2009; Doyle et al., 2010; Lewis, 2012;
Zimmerman et al., 2013). The cutoff threshold below which a market is categorized
as cycler varies across studies; Doyle et al. (2010) applies a cutoff of -0.5 cents, that
was later adopted by Zimmerman et al. (2013) as well. Whereas the median change
in price was used to classify cycling and non-cycling cities before, in this study we
intend to classify patterns of the price dynamics of firms instead. Unlike market-
level prices, which as an average of its stations will most certainly change daily, one
feature of the price dynamics of individual gas stations is the large number of days
when there are not changes in prices. As a result, the median price change has no
power to identify cycling from non-cycling station-level strategies (for example, in
Figure 1.3 both stations have a median price change of zero).
The inability of the median change in price to classify gas stations, however, is
not its primary drawback: it may incur misclassifications at the market level under
certain conditions. The implication of the cycle asymmetry that its accuracy relies
on does not hold whenever the decreasing stages are under or overrepresented, which
happens in practice under the circumstances of retail gasoline markets mentioned
before. For instance, if prices trend upwards, the undercutting phases will be cut
short, which generates a lower count of days with negative changes in price. In
this case, the median price change will tend to misclassify cycling markets as non-
cyclers (e.g., in the case of Figure 1.5b, the median price change is $0.1). On the
other hand, with downward trends, the decreasing stages will be artificially long,
making the median price change prone to misclassify symmetric dynamic patterns as
asymmetric cycles (in the example of Figure 1.5d, the median price change is -$0.1).
But even if the decreasing price stages reach down to the same, steady marginal cost
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every time, if the available data span a relatively short sample period undercutting
stages might be underrepresented, leading to false rejection of cycling behavior (e.g.,
the median price change is $0.1 for Figure 1.5c).
Even though adjusting the cutoff threshold can sometimes mitigate these issues,9
those changes would necessarily be arbitrary and would heavily depend on visual
inspection. The cycling indicator proposed in this paper, on the other hand, over-
comes these misclassification drawbacks of the median change in price by leveraging
changes in steepness of the stages instead of their different duration, therefore its ac-
curacy does not depend on a constant marginal cost or a lengthy data set. In Table
1.1 we report the results of an exercise were cycling and non-cycling price schedules
were simulated and their classification according to the two indicators compared; the
figures are the averages of the indicators across the simulated price series. Without
price trends, both indicators classify the price schedules correctly. When a positive
trend is incorporated, more periods with price increases are generated and then the
median price change goes up. This does not affect the classification of non-cyclers,
but the indicator is on average barely negative for cyclers, which would be incorrectly
classified as non-cyclers based on the most commonly used cutoff thresholds. With
a negative price trend, the median price change goes down and it even takes, on
average, a negative value for non-cyclers, which could therefore be misclassified as
cyclers. The Cycling Ratio, on the other hand, remains consistent throughout those
different scenarios.
Table 1.1: New vs Old indicator performance accuracy with price trends.
No trend Upward trend Downward trend
CR med ∆p CR med ∆p CR med ∆p
Cycling 2.506 -0.101 2.506 -0.002 2.506 -0.175
Non-cycling 0.988 0.006 1.003 0.083 1.028 -0.449
Note. Figures are the average of the indicators across the simulated cycling and non-cycling price series.
The main use we make of our new cycling indicator in this paper is the classification
9Noel (2015) mentions the need to determine the cutoff considering the price trends.
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of all the stations in our sample as cyclers or non-cyclers; however, the new indicator
can be applied to price dynamics at the market level as well. In Table 1.2 we compare
the split of the 313 cities in our data in cyclers and non-cyclers, according to both
the new indicator and the median price change (using the -0.5 cent threshold). For
most markets the indicators coincide; however, almost a quarter of the cities are
non-cyclers according to the median change in price but cyclers according to the new
indicator. This can be in part due to the cutoff used being too stringent, but, as we
will explain in the next section, it is mostly due to the misclassification issues of the
median price change that our new indicator improves upon.
Table 1.2: New vs Old indicator comparison at the market level.
Old indicator
New indicator Non-cycler Cycler Total
Non-cycler 159 0 159
Cycler 73 81 154
Total 232 81 313
Note. The new indicator classifies cities according to their Cycling Ratio and percent price jump; the old indicator
refers to the median price change, using -0.5 cents as cutoff.
1.5 Intra-market pricing strategy heterogeneity
Using the indicator described in Section 1.4, every gas station in our sample was
classified according to its pricing strategy, concretely, based on whether it engages in
asymmetric price cycle dynamics or not. In this section we present our findings on
the heterogeneous cycling behavior found in retail gasoline markets, characterize this
variability between and within cities, and explore its consequences for cross-sectional
price dispersion.
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1.5.1 Cycling heterogeneity: an overview
Every point in Figure 1.6 corresponds to a gas station in our data, and its color
depends on the price strategy it was classified into.10 Blue points represent non-
cycling firms, whereas red and orange represent cycling stations. The distinction
among cyclers accounts for differences in the degree of asymmetry or cycle intensity:
orange is for cycling stations with a Cycling Ratio between 1 and 3, red for Cycling
Ratios of 3 or higher (i.e., prices jump at least three times as fast as they go down).
Figure 1.6 reveals two broad features of asymmetric price cycles in U.S. retail gasoline
markets. First, even though cycling gas stations are highly concentrated in the
Midwest, other metropolitan areas in the South and the West also have a high
concentration of cyclers. Several previous studies have concluded that market-level
cycles in the U.S. are a Midwestern phenomenon (Lewis, 2009; Doyle et al., 2010;
Zimmerman et al., 2013); however Figure 1.6 shows a significant agglomeration of
cycling firms in typically considered non-cycling areas, suggesting there might be
asymmetric price cycles at the market level in these areas too. We test this by
applying our cycling indicator to the average price dynamics of every city in our
sample (see Table 1.2), which confirmed the existence of asymmetric cycles in some
non-Midwest markets in the states of Florida, Georgia, North Carolina, Oklahoma,
South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, and Utah. In some of these cases, the median
price change classifies them as cyclers as well; it might have been the case, then, that
previous work did not find cycle asymmetry there because the cycles were indeed not
present during the time period that their data spanned. In other cases, the median
price change is not negative enough (considering the usual cutoffs) to detect price
cycle asymmetry; this reinforces the advantages and the identification power of our
new cycling indicator.
Figure 1.6 also highlights that, even though there is concentration of cyclers and
non-cyclers in different markets, gas stations with both types of pricing strategy
turn up to a greater or lesser extent all around the country. To better illustrate
this result, Figure 1.7 shows a closer look at some selected markets. The cities of










































































































Chicago in Figure 1.7a and Dallas in Figure 1.7b are overall cycling markets, while
both Boston in Figure 1.7c and Los Angeles in Figure 1.7d are non-cycling markets.
Although most firms in cycling markets are cyclers and vice versa,11 both pricing
strategies are found in each type of market, sometimes coexisting yards away from
each other (Figure 1.8a). Figure 1.9 depicts the average price dynamics of cycling
and non-cycling stations separately for our two examples of cycling cities; clearly,
the overall cycling nature of these markets is inherited from the dynamic patterns of
their large proportion of cycling stations.
We also explore whether gas stations stick always to the same pricing strategy or
instead change it over time. To do this, we constructed daily station-level indicators
using price dynamics within a two-month rolling window.12 As explained in Section
1.4, the robustness of our cycling indicator to short data periods allows us to perform
this exercise accurately. Based on this daily indicator, we calculated the share of
cycling and non-cycling stations in the U.S. for every day in our sample period,
shown in Figure 1.10a. The fluctuation of this share reveals that firms in U.S. retail
gasoline markets do switch pricing strategies over time; only 26% of the gas stations
in our sample stick to either a cycling or non-cycling strategy during the whole period
(Table 1.10b). In that sense, the full-sample cycling indicator we use throughout the
paper summarizes the pricing strategy that each gas station most predominantly
followed.
1.5.2 What predicts cycling behavior?
In light of our findings in Subsection 1.5.1, we explore which location characteristics
and station features are associated with each type of pricing strategy (Table A.1 and
Table A.3; the dependent variable is the cycling indicator). In Table A.1 the estima-
tions include city-brand fixed effects, so the results aim to explain the variability in
11The share of cycling stations does not seem to uniquely determine cycling at the market level.
Preliminary results show that there is a non-linear relationship between the two, and it interacts
with station-type concentration; for the cycling pattern to show up in average prices, cycling stations
do not only need to be enough, but also effectively coordinate cycle peaks and troughs.
12We also tried an alternative window of 4 months with very similar results, see Subsection 1.6.1.
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Figure 1.7: Heterogeneous price strategies within markets.
(a) Chicago, IL. (b) Dallas, TX.
(c) Boston, MA. (d) Los Angeles, CA.
Note. Blue points represent non-cycling gas stations. Red and orange indicate different levels of cycling asymmetry.
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Figure 1.8: Close-by gas stations with different price strategies.
(a) Two cycling stations and one non-cycling station yards away in the Chicago area.
(b) Price differential between gas stations with different price strategies.
Note. Images were screenshotted from Google Maps and Street view (captured in November 2017). Panel (a) shows
heterogeneous price dynamics types of three gas stations in Park Ridge IL, located yards away from each other.
Panel (b) shows very different posted prices for two of these stations at the same time.
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(b) Station strategy switching.
Note. For each gas station, cycling indicators were calculated at every day in the sample using a two-month window.
Panel (a) shows the resulting share of cycling and non-cycling stations in the U.S. over time. Panel (b) breaks down
the firms according to whether they changed strategies during the sample period or not.
cycling behavior of same-brand stations within the same market. Non-cycling sta-
tions tend to be located in more densely populated areas. Furthermore, consistent
with Doyle et al. (2010), we found a non-linear relationship with station density:
cycling is more likely at intermediate levels of station concentration; it peaks at 6 or
7 gas stations in a 1-mile radius. However, once we control for the cycling behavior
of neighbors, station density loses explanatory power, suggesting that Doyle et al.
(2010)’s geographic differentiation vs. market power channel does not drive this re-
sult. A station’s cycling indicator is strongly correlated with the cycling indicator of
its closest neighbor—and with the average cycling behavior of neighboring stations
in general—although that influence fades away the more isolated the station is. This
result implies that gas stations following the same pricing strategy are on average
expected to be found bunched together.
Table A.3 looks at the association between cycling and station brand size and
features. Stations with convenience stores are more likely to be cyclers, regardless
of their brand size. This result complements the empirical findings of Doyle et al.
(2010), who find a positive relationship between cycling markets and the presence
of convenience stores, but only those operated by independent gas stations. Some
of our results, however, contrast with the predictions of Doyle et al. (2010)’s model.
In particular, we find that complementary goods other than convenience store, such
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as service station or restaurant, are negatively correlated with cycling. Also, both
the smallest and the largest brands are less likely to cycle, therefore their brand
loyalty channel to explain non-cycling strategies finds no support. However, we do
find evidence for one of the predictions of Doyle et al. (2010)’s model: stations with
a higher proportion of consumers with propensity to not switch gas stations are less
likely to cycle. We mentioned how both channels explored in Doyle et al. (2010) to
test that prediction, geographic differentiation and brand loyalty, do not hold in our
results. The richness of our station-level data allows us to identify a better way in
which that prediction can be tested. We find that big-brand gas stations offering
discounts, either through loyalty cards or cash discounts, are much more likely to be
non-cyclers. These are very relevant predictors of cycling behavior; we will return to
these results in Section 1.6.
1.5.3 Pricing strategy heterogeneity and price dispersion
As mentioned in Section 1.2, vast attention has been paid in the literature to cross-
sectional price variation within markets. In examining the determinants of price
levels or price dispersion, studies have considered several types of variables associ-
ated with these price differentials: location characteristics, station features, local
concentration of stations, brand, etc. Researchers have not previously related price
levels or price dispersion to asymmetric cycling in gasoline markets, because cycle
asymmetry is a phenomenon so far only documented at the market level. In this
paper, we introduce a new dimension of station heterogeneity within markets, the
cycling vs. non-cycling pricing strategy, whose effect on price levels—compared to
other determinants—we explore in this subsection.
Table 1.3 presents a simple analysis of the effect of previously-considered determi-
nants and the pricing strategy on station-level prices. The results are fairly consistent
with previous findings: stations charge higher prices in higher income neighborhoods
and when located on a highway, and they charge lower prices overall the higher the
station density. Prices are also related to the presence of certain station characteris-
tics, after controlling for city-brand fixed effects. The effect of the pricing strategy is
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included through the indicator variable ‘Cycler’, that takes value one for stations en-
gaging in asymmetric cycles and zero otherwise (column (2) uses our more stringent
version of the cycling indicator defined in Section 1.4). We find that cycling stations
charge prices 3.43 cents lower than non-cycling stations on average. The magnitude
of this effect is considerably higher than almost every other determinant, whose co-
efficients rarely exceed one cent in absolute value. Interestingly, two of the station
characteristics with reasonably large coefficients, loyalty card and cash discounts, are
also negatively correlated with cycling behavior. Table 1.4 shows that gas stations
that neither offer cash discounts nor loyalty cards are much less likely to be cyclers
and, among them, the cycling price gap is significantly higher. This reflects that
non-cyclers in this group charge price premiums both for the discount features and
for the non-cycling strategy. When the restricted sample is used in column (2) of
Table 1.3 the coefficient associated with cycling behavior is 80% larger, becoming by
far the dominant explanatory factor for price levels. The interpretation of the cycling
coefficient, as well as the issues needed to be tackled in order to identify it, will be
discussed in detail in Subsection 1.6.1. At this point, these results reveal that the
difference in pricing strategies is a significant determinant of price variability within
markets that has not been considered before.
1.6 Explaining asymmetric price cycles
We have so far documented the existence of different pricing strategies among gas
stations within cities in the U.S. retail gasoline industry. Concretely, we provided
evidence that some firms engage in asymmetric price cycle dynamics while others do
not, even stations of the same brand in the same local markets. We illustrated some
of the consequences of that heterogeneity in terms of cross-sectional price dispersion.
In this section, we attempt to shed some light on the reasons behind the cycles and
the variability in cycling behavior. We begin by reassessing the validity of previous
explanations mentioned in Section 1.2, collusion and Edgeworth cycles. Our results
indicate that neither of these theoretical foundations of asymmetric cycles finds full
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Income (log) 0.206∗∗∗ 0.242∗∗∗
(0.010) (0.011)
Population density -0.022∗∗∗ -0.011∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001)
On highway 0.184∗∗∗ 0.188∗∗∗
(0.010) (0.012)
No. of neighboring stations -0.241∗∗∗ -0.151∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.004)
No. of neighbors (sq) 0.008∗∗∗ 0.003∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000)
Station characteristics
Offers loyalty discount 0.586∗∗∗ 0.375∗∗∗
(0.010) (0.012)
Offers cash discount 3.535∗∗∗ 3.488∗∗∗
(0.011) (0.014)
Has convenience store -0.115∗∗∗ -0.163∗∗∗
(0.010) (0.012)
Has restaurant 0.341∗∗∗ 0.207∗∗∗
(0.010) (0.011)
Has car wash -0.304∗∗∗ -0.312∗∗∗
(0.008) (0.009)
Has service station 1.730∗∗∗ 1.726∗∗∗
(0.012) (0.015)




Date-Zip FE Yes Yes
City-Brand FE Yes Yes
Sample Full Rest.
Note. Dependent variable: price of regular gasoline, in cents; the observation level is a station-day combination.
Standard errors in parenthesis. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Table 1.4: Cycling behavior, cycling price gap, and discounts.
Loyalty card: No Loyalty card: Yes
% cyclers cycling-gap % cyclers cycling-gap
Cash discount: No 61% -3.14 55% -3.46
Cash discount: Yes 39% -3.33 36% -4.42
support in light of our new evidence. Lastly, in Subsection 1.6.3 we exploit the
richness of our station-level strategy results in order to take the explanation of cycling
asymmetry in a new direction, related to serving of consumers with different price
sensitivity.
1.6.1 Are cycles collusive?
Beyond the popular Edgeworth cycle explanation, which we will look into in Subsec-
tion 1.6.2, the issue of whether there are collusive components behind these asym-
metric cycles or not has recently caught the attention of a new strand of literature.
As mentioned in Section 1.2, these authors argue that the high levels of coordination
found among firms in the increasing stages are evidence of the collusive nature of the
cycles. One testable prediction if these asymmetric cycles were the result of some tra-
ditional form of collusion is that the existence of cycles should lead to higher prices.
A convincing identification of the effect of cycles on prices, however, has eluded the
literature so far. Since asymmetric cycles have been considered a market-level phe-
nomenon, previous attempts have relied either on price comparisons of markets with
and without cycles, or on market-level price differences before and after cycles ap-
pear or disappear. The results from most of these strategies, as the literature warns,
should not be given a causal interpretation due to the presence of market-level con-
founders, either unobservable characteristics or observable features of the market
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structure that are very closely correlated with the presence of cycles.13 In this pa-
per, we provide a new dimension of asymmetric cycle variability—the intra-market
heterogeneity in cycling behavior—which we exploit as an identification strategy to
better estimate the cycle-induced price gap.
Figure 1.11 illustrates the comparison between the previously available source of
variability and the new identification strategy that we utilize for the estimation of the
effect of asymmetric cycles on price levels. As mentioned before, most previous work
measured this effect by comparing cycling and non-cycling markets; Figure 1.11a
replicates that comparison for the markets in our data. Consistent with the literature,
non-cycling markets have higher prices than cycling markets, on average. This price
gap, however, cannot be attributed solely to the lack of cycles, because these markets
might be different in ways other than the cycling patterns. With cycling variability
at the market level, these differences cannot be reliably controlled for, because they
are either unobservable or too closely correlated with the existence of cycles. To
address these identification issues, we exploit a different level of variability in cycling
behavior: the within-market heterogeneity in cycling strategies. In Figure 1.11b
we overlap the price dynamics of the gas stations of Figure 1.8; noticeably, the
non-cycling station’s prices are in general higher than those of the cycling stations.
Since these firms are located close to each other, they face the same local market
characteristics; this in turn implies that the market-level confounders are controlled
for in this comparison. In what follows, we use this source of identification to measure
the effect of asymmetric cycling behavior on price levels.
The results are presented in Table 1.5. The dependent variable is the daily, station-
level price of regular gasoline in cents, and the main explanatory variable is the
pricing strategy of the gas station, measured with the full-sample cycling indicator
presented in Section 1.4 (other price-level determinants are also controlled for, as
in Table 1.3). In column (1) the price gap was obtained without local market fixed
effects; not accounting for the market confounders gives an average difference in
price of 11 cents between cycling and non-cycling stations. Once the daily market
13One exception could be Noel (2015)’s natural experiment approach, although, by definition, it
lacks external validity.
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(b) Cycling vs. non-cycling stations in the same market, Chicago IL.
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environment is controlled for by including date-zipcode fixed effects in column (2),
the price gap decreases by almost 70%. This discrepancy reveals the extent of bias
in the estimation of the price gap when one does not control for local conditions by
exploiting within-market heterogeneity in cycling behavior. If the effect on price of
the different brands by city is further canceled out, we reach our main specification
result: gas stations that exhibit asymmetric cycling patterns in their price dynamics
charge on average 3.43 cents less for regular gasoline than stations that follow non-
cycling pricing strategies (this is the price gap reported in column (1) of Table 1.3).
In other words, under the same market structure, same-brand firms offering identical
amenities and with equal location characteristics charge on average a significantly
lower price if they are cyclers. There is a baseline effect of 2.7 cents, and then
the gap increases the higher the cycling intensity (i.e., the more asymmetric the
cycles, indicated by a higher Cycling Ratio). This result holds for premium and
midgrade gasoline as well (see Table A.6). As shown in Table 1.3, the magnitude of
the coefficient almost doubles if the results are estimated using the restricted sample
(Table A.5).
The up-and-down nature of cyclers’ price dynamics would suggest that the average
gap previously estimated changes systematically over time. The main specification
of column (3), but interacting the cycling indicator with the date fixed effect, yields
the coefficients plotted in Figure 1.12. It can be noticed how the price gap shrinks,
sometimes even becoming positive, in periods of cycle peaks.
The results shown so far use the full-sample cycling indicator, which classifies gas
stations according to the pricing strategy that they most predominantly followed.
As described in Subsection 1.5.1, we also constructed daily station-level cycling in-
dicators using the price dynamics of a two-month rolling window around each day.
Accordingly, an additional test for the existence of a price gap induced by cycling
behavior would be to compare a gas station price level in periods when it engages in
cycles and in periods when it does not.14 The results of such exercise are reported
in columns (5) and (6) of Table 1.5, where the estimation used the varying cycling
14Figure A.5 in the Appendix displays the Cycling Ratio distributions for periods of cycling and
non-cycling.
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Table 1.5: The effect of asymmetric price cycles on gasoline price levels.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Cycling indicator -11.446∗∗∗ -4.910∗∗∗ -3.429∗∗∗ -2.710∗∗∗
(0.019) (0.008) (0.007) (0.010)
Cycling intensity -0.315∗∗∗
(0.003)
Varying cycling ind. -0.576∗∗∗ -0.442∗∗∗
(0.006) (0.007)
Varying cycling int. -0.047∗∗∗
(0.001)
R2 0.2594 0.9359 0.9599 0.9600 0.9862 0.9862
Obs 10,113,008 10,113,008 10,113,008 10,113,008 7,141,398 7,141,398
Ȳ 256.080 256.080 256.080 256.080 254.119 254.119
Date FE Yes
Date-Zip FE No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
City-Brand FE No No Yes Yes
Station FE No No No No Yes Yes
Note. Dependent variable: price of regular gasoline, in cents; the observation level is a station-day combination.
Cycling indicator is the full-sample indicator of cycling behavior; cycle intensity is the full-sample Cycling Ratio.
Varying cycle indicator and intensity are the date-level versions of those two variables. Standard errors in parenthesis.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Note. The coefficients plotted are the date-cycler fixed effect on price, controlling for zipcode and brand.
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indicator and included gas station fixed effects. The decreasing effect of asymmetric
cycling strategies on prices survives even when looking into the dynamics of an indi-
vidual firm: the prices charged by a gas station are relatively lower on average when
the station cycles than when it does not.15
Lastly, in Figure 1.13 we explore how this cycling price gap differs across markets
in our sample. The distribution of price gaps is shown in Figure 1.13a. Although
more research remains to be done to explain the variability in market price gaps,
we suggest one possible direction in Figure 1.13b. On the one hand, the cycling
classification of the market-level price dynamics does not seem to be systematically
related to the existence of a positive price gap, nor to the magnitude of negative
price gaps. On the other hand, there seems to be a non-linear relationship between
the share of cycling stations and the price gap: the price differential between cycling
and non-cycling stations seems to be bigger in markets where cycling stations are
either relatively very few or they are the big majority.
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(b) Market price gap and share of cyclers.
Note. The market price gap is the coefficient of the market-cycler fixed effect.
The results presented in this subsection demonstrate that gas stations engaging
in asymmetric cycles charge on average lower prices than non-cycling gas stations.
15Other robustness checks of Table 1.5 using a four-month rolling window (Table A.7) and
controlling for neighbors cycling behavior (Table A.8) are presented in the Appendix.
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This finding can naturally be interpreted as evidence against the hypothesis posed by
some previous work that cycles in retail gasoline markets are the result of traditional
forms of collusion. In this sense, the coordination of firms in the restoring stage of
the cycles seems to be the realization of some specific form of firm interaction rather
than involving collusive behavior in the conventional sense. The remainder of the
paper is devoted to understanding the nature of those interactions. We first assess
to which extent Edgeworth cycles can explain the cycling pattern found in our data.
Finally, we suggest insights on why cycle heterogeneity arises within markets.
1.6.2 Edgeworth cycles revisited
As mentioned in Section 1.2, the overwhelming majority of empirical studies of price
cycles in retail gasoline markets align with the theory of Edgeworth cycles (Maskin
and Tirole, 1988). In this subsection, we document ways in which the standard
version of that theory and its available extensions are inconsistent with our new
findings. The first and foremost limitation is the assumption underlying virtually
every previous work on Edgeworth cycles that all firms in a cycling market engage
in cycling patterns and vice versa. As we documented in Section 1.5, there is a
high degree of heterogeneity in cycling behavior within markets, sometimes even
within yards distance, which entirely rules out the accuracy of that assumption. The
only contribution that steps into the right direction in that sense is Doyle et al.
(2010)’s. In their model, they aim to explain why some markets display cycles while
others do not by treating cycling behavior as a firm-level decision, driven by some
station characteristics. However, they test their model with aggregated data and are
silent about the possibility of cycling heterogeneity within local markets. We also
discussed earlier in Subsection 1.5.2 how the station features that should predict
cycling according to their model—i.e., brand loyalty, geographic differentiation, and
complementary goods—do not necessarily find support in our firm-level results. For
the theory of Edgeworth cycles or its extensions to be able to explain the observed
patterns in the retail gasoline industry an adaptation rendering cycling strategy
heterogeneity at the station level would be needed. We address a way in which that
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can be accomplished in Subsection 1.6.3.
Apart from these limitations, another drawback of Edgeworth cycles as an expla-
nation of the asymmetric cycles in retail gasoline prices comes from the fact that one
testable prediction of the model is decidedly contradicted by our data. The main
empirical prediction of the theory is the asymmetry of the cycles in price dynamics;
the resemblance of the asymmetric cycles in retail gasoline markets to the pattern
of Edgeworth cycle dynamic pricing equilibrium was what linked the observed phe-
nomenon to Maskin and Tirole (1988)’s explanation in the first place. Even though
it has been claimed that the theory does not offer any other testable predictions,
there is an additional feature of Edgeworth cycles that can be tested in the data.
In Maskin and Tirole (1988)’s Edgeworth cycle equilibrium, the decreasing phase
of the cycle has firms undercutting each other until they reach marginal cost. At
the trough of the cycle, the firms enter a war of attrition in which they randomize
between restoring price or not; once one of them does relent, the other follows and a
new cycle is initiated. One consequence of that mechanism is that the cycle length
should be random; in particular, it should not be possible to predict when firms leave
the trough of the cycle. However, we find strong weekly patterns in the asymmetric
cycle dynamics,16 revealing that the timing of price relenting could be predicted by
day of the week.
To illustrate this claim, Figure 1.14 overlaps the price dynamics of cycling sta-
tions in our cycling market examples of Chicago and Dallas with weekly markers;
the shaded areas indicate Monday-Tuesday-Wednesday intervals. One regularity to
notice is that when a new cycle starts it does so at the beginning of the week, and
then a cycle peak occurs certainly within a couple of days. On the other hand, the
time span between cycle troughs is always weekly, biweekly, triweekly, and so on.
These two observations imply that the duration of the cycles can be approximately
measured in multiples of weeks, and that which multiple depends on whether a price
jump is triggered in that market early in the week or not. In what follows we look
16Weekly patterns in asymmetric retail gasoline price cycles have been documented before (see,
e.g., Lewis and Noel (2011)); however, they have not been analyzed as a contradiction of the
fundamentals of Edgeworth cycles.
34
into each of those regularities.
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Note. These price dynamics correspond to the average price of cycling stations in each market.
We first explore which days of the week are more likely to be cycle peaks or troughs.
For each cycling gas station, we calculated the empirical probability distribution of
peaks and troughs across days of the week, in terms of their relative frequency;
then, we averaged the day-of-the-week probabilities of peaks and troughs at the
market level. Figure 1.15 shows the results for our two example markets. Both
Chicago’s and Dallas’ gas stations are more likely to have cycle peaks on Thursdays
(Figure 1.15a). As for the troughs, gas stations in Chicago are more likely to reach
cycle troughs quite similarly either Monday, Tuesday, or Wednesday; in Dallas, gas
stations’ probabilities of trough are concentrated on Monday, followed by Tuesday
and Sunday (Figure 1.15b). Comparing Figures 1.15a and 1.15b, even though peak
probabilities are better lined up on Thursday for both markets, the distributions
are flatter (i.e., there is a mode on Thursday but the average probability does not
differ greatly among days of the week). Contrarily, Chicago and Dallas market
average probabilities of trough are shifted apart, but these distributions are much
more concentrated than peak distributions.
The findings just described for our example markets hold for our entire sample as
well. We calculated these average empirical probability distributions of peaks and
troughs for each market in our sample. Based on that, we defined the market peak
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Figure 1.15: Day-of-week distribution of troughs and peaks, Chicago and Dallas.
(a) Peaks. (b) Troughs.
Note. For each cycling gas station, the relative frequency of peaks and troughs by day of the week was calculated.
Depicted is the average of those empirical probabilities at the market level.
(trough) as the day of the week with highest probability of being a peak (trough);
for example, Figures 1.15a and 1.15b imply that Chicago’s peak and trough are
Thursday and Tuesday, respectively, while Dallas’ are Thursday and Monday. Table
1.16a summarizes the results; it shows how many markets have their peak and trough
at each day of the week.17 The majority of the cities in our sample (59%) are more
likely to have cycle peaks on Thursdays. Even though the market troughs are not
that centered around one day of the week, Monday, Tuesday, and Wednesday contain
over 85% of market troughs.
We explore the flatness of peak (trough) distributions using as a measure the
maximum probability of a peak (trough), that is, the average empirical probability
of the market peak (trough) as define above. For example, from Figures 1.15a and
1.15b the maximum peak probability in Dallas is 0.2172 and in Chicago is 0.1930;
the maximum trough probability is 0.3258 for Dallas (the average probability of the
market trough, which is Monday for Dallas) and 0.2275 for Chicago. Figure 1.16b
depicts the densities of market maximum probabilities of peaks and troughs. Just as
17The total number of markets is 293—instead of 313—because we excluded markets with less
than 10 cycling gas stations, as their average empirical probabilities were very noisy.
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Figure 1.16: Market-level peaks and troughs.
Day-of-week Peaks % Troughs %
Monday 27 9.22 78 26.62
Tuesday 34 11.60 103 35.15
Wednesday 21 7.17 72 24.56
Thursday 173 59.04 27 9.22
Friday 17 5.80 2 .68
Saturday 4 1.37 1 .34
Sunday 17 5.80 10 3.41
Total 293 100.00 293 100.00









.15 .2 .25 .3 .35 .4
Probability
Max. prob. of peak Max prob. of trough
(b) Max. prob. of peaks and troughs.
Note. (a) 293 markets broken down according to the day of the week they more likely have peaks and troughs. (b)
The maximum probability of peak (trough) is the probability of peak (trough) of the market day-of-the-week peak
(trough).
in the Chicago and Dallas example, peak distributions are more similar but flatter
(maximum probability density has a higher mode, but is centered at a low probability
value), whereas the trough distributions can be more or less concentrated in different
markets (e.g., it is more concentrated in Dallas than in Chicago) but are in general
more concentrated than peak distributions (the density of the maximum probability
of troughs is shifted to the right with respect to peaks).
These results indicate that, for a given market, the day of the week for the occur-
rence of cycle troughs is easier to predict than for peaks. The importance of these
results for the overall predictability of cycle peaks and troughs is nonetheless played
down by the fact that cycles reach their peaks certainly within a couple of days after
a trough, whereas troughs do not necessarily occur a certain number of days after a
peak. The distance between troughs, however, can be always measured in multiples
of weeks. This stresses the importance of understanding the nature of cycle troughs,
rather than the emphasis on cycle peaks commonly found in the literature.
The issue of why price restoring is triggered at the beginning of some weeks and not
others should be investigated thoroughly. We aim to contribute to that discussion
by showing the relationship between price relenting and changes in costs. As it is
well documented in the literature, the cycle asymmetry in retail gasoline prices is
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not inherited from asymmetry in upstream price dynamics. In our data period, for
example, the Cycling Ratios of two common proxies for costs, crude oil prices and
New York gasoline futures, are 0.85 and 0.82, respectively (see Figure A.6). Instead,
in Table 1.6 we explore whether changes in wholesale prices are likely to trigger retail
price restorations of cycling gas stations. The observation level is a cycling station-
day combination; the dependent variable takes a value of one if the gas station had
a trough that day, and zero otherwise. Our results indicate that an increase in costs
either that day, the day before, or two days ago is associated with a higher chance that
the gas station relents (we proxy for cost with the price of crude oil18). We control
for city-day of the week fixed effects, therefore the interpretation holds on average for
any given market-level probability of trough each day of the week. Most importantly,
an increase in cost is twice more likely to trigger a price restoration on the day of
the week that corresponds to the market trough. The results are more pronounced
when run only for cycling markets, where there are many well-synchronized cycling
gas stations. This suggests that whether or not firms face changes in wholesale costs
close to the market-level trough might be a key factor in determining which weeks
will mark the beginning of a cycle in a given market.
In this subsection we provided evidence that the standard Edgeworth cycle theory
cannot account for one key feature of asymmetric cycles in retail gasoline markets,
which is the n-week duration of the cycles with troughs systematically aligned by
day of the week. We documented which days of the week are more likely to be peaks
and troughs, and discussed some reasons why new cycles begin some weeks and no
others. Left to be addressed is why Monday, Tuesday, and Wednesday are the days
of the week when troughs occur in almost every market. Possible explanations can be
associated with different price elasticity of consumers within a week.19 Cycling firms
may decrease prices to attract price-searching consumers; when the week starts and
demand becomes more inelastic (e.g., because consumers less-flexibly need gasoline
for work commuting) is when they can afford to temporarily charge higher prices.
18Table A.9 in the Appendix explores the same analysis using New York gasoline futures instead,
with similar results.
19This phenomenon has been proven to exist in other industries; see Puller and Taylor (2012)
for an example of day-of-the-week price discrimination by U.S. airlines.
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Table 1.6: Price restoration and changes in cost for cycling stations.
Full sample Cycling markets
∆costt > 0 0.023
∗∗∗ 0.034∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000)
∆costt−1 > 0 0.020
∗∗∗ 0.030∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000)
∆costt−2 > 0 0.013
∗∗∗ 0.019∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000)
Market trough=1 × ∆costt > 0=1 0.023∗∗∗ 0.029∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001)
Market trough=1 × ∆costt−1 > 0=1 0.026∗∗∗ 0.040∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001)




Week-Zip FE Yes Yes
Brand FE Yes Yes
City-dow FE Yes Yes
Note. Dependent variable: 1(station-level trough); the observation level is a cycling station-day combination. Stan-
dard errors in parenthesis. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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In line with this reasoning, below we provide evidence on the relationship between
cycling behavior an consumer price search.
1.6.3 Consumer search and price sensitivity
We have shown so far that asymmetric cycling strategies seem to be the realization
of some form of imperfect competition rather than the result of collusion. We also
showed that Maskin and Tirole (1988)’s theory of Edgeworth cycles and its few
available extensions are inadequate to fully account for the patterns found in our
results: n-week duration of the cycles and high degree of cycling heterogeneity within
markets. In this last subsection, we contribute to the discussion of what explains
these cycles and their heterogeneity with new evidence indicating that gas stations
might be dividing markets up by choosing pricing strategies that attract different
types of consumers.
Some of the results from previous sections hint in the direction of cycling and
non-cycling stations following different strategies to appeal consumers. The negative
cycling price gap and the fact that cycling stations concentrate lower prices in certain
days of the week will attract price-sensitive consumers more inclined to price search
or willing to restrict their gas purchases to particular days. If this were the case, one
would expect non-cycling stations drawing more inelastic consumers. In Subsection
1.5.2 we showed how non-cycling stations are strongly more likely to offer cash or
loyalty discounts, which indicates that they may actually be dividing up the pricing
space in a different way. These discounts work as a laid-back search strategy for
consumers not willing to actively search for low prices, but willing to incur the hassles
of carrying station cards or cash. For consumers not willing to do so, they charge
much higher prices. Because of their low propensity to search, these consumers will
also be attracted to non-cycling stations’ fewer and milder changes in prices. In
contrast, cycling stations appeal attentive, price-sensitive consumers, also drawn by
cyclers’ frequent and sizable changes in price. In what follows, we provide evidence
in favor of this explanation of the coexistence of heterogeneous cycling strategies
in equilibrium. First, some scattered indications of the relationship between price
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search and cycling behavior are presented; we then delve into a more systematic
measure of that relationship.
Table 1.7 contains findings that align with the hypothesis of elastic consumers
sorting themselves into cycling stations. In Table 1.7a, cycling stations are shown
to be less likely to be found on state borders, but if in the border they tend to
locate on the lower-state tax side. Gas stations have been proven to bunch on the
lower side of the border (Hurtado, 2018); consumers using those gas stations will be
comparatively more prone to be looking for cheaper prices. Table 1.7b analyzes the
surcharge for premium (or midgrade) gasoline applied by gas stations when facing dif-
ferent demand preferences. The results indicate that cycling stations charge a lower
price differential for premium or midgrade gasoline in higher income neighborhoods.
Wealthier consumers are more prone to search for cheaper premium (or midgrade)
gas prices,20 since they are more likely to actually demand that product; then, the
finding in Table 1.7b can be the consequence of cycling gas stations intending to
capture those high-income, search-oriented consumers.

















Income (log) -0.017∗∗ -0.005
(0.007) (0.007)





Date-Zip FE Yes Yes
City-Brand FE Yes Yes
(b) Premium/midgrade surcharge.
Note. (a) Dependent variable: cycling indicator; the observation level is a gas station. In border = 1(station located
within 5 miles of the state border). For measures of state taxes see Hurtado (2018). (b) Dependent variable: premium
and midgrade price differentials with respect to regular gasoline price, in percentage points; the observation level is
a station-date combination. Standard errors in parenthesis. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
To assess the relationship between firm cycling strategies and consumer price sen-
20We confirm that relationship using the measure of price search frequency that we introduce
later.
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sitivity in U.S. retail gasoline markets in a more definite and systematic fashion, we
construct a measure of search activity using the nature of our data. As described in
Section 1.3, we use consumer-reported data retrieved at the same time every day and
we observe how long ago each price was reported. Gas stations with prices reported
more frequently will tend to have lower ‘how long ago’ values; therefore, a measure
of reporting frequency would be inversely related to that variable. We define such a
measure simply as 24-‘how long ago’21 and use this ‘popularity’ index as a proxy for
the level of search activity, since price reports are the result of consumers searching
for cheap prices through the app.22
The average popularity of U.S. cycling and non-cycling stations over our sample
period is presented in Figure 1.17. For both types of gas stations, the reporting
frequency seems to drop in general right before the shaded areas, that is, during
the weekends. Most interestingly, in this raw comparison cycling gas stations have
arguably more reports than non-cycling ones. Some identification concerns need to be
addressed, however, before claiming that this purely reflects more price-searching of
cycling station’s consumers. First, users of the app might be more prone to report the
price of the gas station they actually end up buying gas from, which will most likely
be the one with the lowest price. Since we found that cycling gas stations generally
charge lower prices than non-cycling ones, part of the difference in reporting from
Figure 1.17 may merely reflect that difference in price and not the cycling strategy
itself. Second, users can report a price they spot both if it is different than in the app
(i.e., correct or update a price), as well as if it is unchanged (i.e., check or confirm
a price). If they are more likely to report in the former case, this would bias the
effect of cycling on consumer search behavior upwards, because cycling gas stations
change their prices more often.
Table 1.8 shows how much search activity differs for consumers of cycling and
non-cycling stations, accounting for the identification issues previously pointed out.
21We chose that measure because ‘how long ago’ is expressed in hours, and we preferred a linear
transformation. The value of the variable itself does not have a meaningful interpretation, but its
usefulness comes from its direct relationship with reporting and search.
22See Byrne et al. (2013) for another example of the use of report frequency as a proxy for search
intensity.
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Oct-17 Nov-17 Dec-17 Jan-18 Feb-18 Mar-18 Apr-18
Non-cyclers Cyclers
Note. Report frequency proxied for with a measure constructed based on how long ago prices were reported.
The day-of-the-week fixed effects included in the estimation are displayed in Figure
A.7, where the drop in reporting activity during the weekends is confirmed. The
results in Table 1.8 indicate that, indeed, consumer search is higher for cycling than
for non-cycling stations, even after controlling for the price level and the frequency
with which stations change their prices. We additionally considered if consumers
change their report intensity in different stages of the cycle (peaks and troughs).
We find that searching activity is higher right before and during peaks, and lower
at troughs. Since we control for day of the week and price level, this finding can
solely be attributed to the awareness of consumers of when peaks and troughs are
more likely to happen in each market, which in turn translates into the recognition
of gains from search being higher (lower) at peaks (troughs). Notice also that this
effect is intensified for cycling stations’ consumers, because they are more attentive
and knowledgeable of the structure of the cycles.
1.7 Conclusions
This paper identifies the presence of asymmetric cycles in individual gas station
price dynamics, and classifies firms in retail gasoline markets according to their
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Cycler=1 × Peak today=1 -0.008
(0.010)
Cycler=1 × Peak tomorrow=1 0.010
(0.010)
Cycler=1 × Trough today=1 -0.034∗∗∗
(0.009)







Note: p-values in parenthesis. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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cycling and non-cycling strategies. The cycling indicator we propose represents a
methodological contribution since, unlike the one previously used in the literature,
it is suited to the identification of cycles at the station level and it is robust to the
presence of price trends and short periods of data. The coexistence of both types
of gas stations found within markets contrasts with previous work on asymmetric
cycles in retail gasoline markets, where asymmetric cycles were regarded as a market-
level phenomenon. In this sense, the focus on market-level price dynamics has so
far prevented this literature from contributing to the explanation of the equally
puzzling intra-market, cross-sectional price variability. Indeed, we find that cycling
behavior is a significant determinant of gas stations’ price level: stations that engage
in asymmetric-cycle strategies charge on average 3.43 cents less than non-cycling
stations. On the other hand, our results invite to revisit the discussion on asymmetric
cycles and market-level price dispersion. It has recently been argued that these cycles
are associated with high price dispersion (Noel, 2019). An exploratory analysis in
Figure 1.18, however, suggests that markets with higher share of cycling stations—
which tend to be cycling markets—present a relatively low and systematic daily
overall price dispersion. Market-level price cycle asymmetry does not seem to induce
price dispersion in the cross-section; if anything, a high share of well-synchronized
cycling stations seem to guarantee relatively low levels of dispersion compared to an
average non-cycling market. This issue deserves further and more careful research
left for future work.
In terms of the reasons behind these cycles and the heterogeneity in cycling behav-
ior, a setting where gas stations’ pricing strategies attract different type of consumers
is consistent with our data. The Edgeworth cycle model that, with little exception,
has served as the theoretical foundation of the empirical literature in retail gasoline
price cycles, finds no support in our results, as we find that one of the testable predic-
tions of its standard version does not hold in light of our new evidence. Our negative
cycle-induced price gap also rules out recent concerns that these cycles could be col-
lusive in nature, which have led to investigations by competition authorities. Since
the lack of a valid identification strategy for the estimation of the effect of cycles on
price levels restricted the ability of previous work to test this fundamental empirical
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Figure 1.18: Market-level cross-sectional price dispersion and asymmetric cycles.
Note. Each point represent a market in our sample; price dispersion is measured as the average of daily standard
deviations of prices.
prediction of conventional forms of collusion, the intra-market variability in cycling
behavior that we exploit for such estimation is also a valuable contribution in that
sense. Our results indicate that the presence of asymmetric cycles in retail gasoline
markets do not pose a threat to consumers and therefore are not a public policy issue
to be addressed. On the contrary, these cycles make price changes easier to predict
and are associated with lower prices and lower market-level price dispersion, all of





FROM U.S. AIRLINE MERGERS
Joint with Jorge Lemus and Guillermo Marshall
2.1 Introduction
How does organizational consolidation after a merger impact a firm’s productivity
and performance? Answering this question is generally difficult because a merger
simultaneously changes competitive incentives and disrupts the organization, both
of which may lead to changes in productivity and performance. Merger regulations
in the U.S. airline industry provide a unique opportunity to separate these effects.
We use data on airlines’ on-time performance—a widely accepted measure of product
quality—to study how the organizational disruption from the organizational disrup-
tion caused by a merger impacts the firm’s ability to provide quality.
When two large firms merge, organization consolidation requires the unification
of diverse work forces, labor contracts, physical capital, technology systems, and
other factors affecting the merged firm’s productivity. While a successful integration
could create merger-induced efficiencies, which may ultimately benefit consumers, a
rocky integration may delay or altogether prevent the attainment of these efficiencies
(Steigenberger, 2016; Weber and Camerer, 2003). Our contribution is to measure
how the challenges of organizational consolidation after a merger impact on-time
performance over time. Does organizational consolidation damage a firm’s ability to
provide quality? How long do these effects last? Do the merging firms reinforce each
other and improve their performance after merging?
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To address these questions, we use administrative data from the U.S. airline in-
dustry on the on-time performance of millions of flights over a decade. We exploit
a unique feature of the airline industry: there is a time gap between the date of the
merger and the date when the merging firms are allowed to consolidate and oper-
ate as a single airline. This time gap, created by industry regulations1, allows us
to identify non-organizational effect of a merger separately from the organizational
disruption effect. The non-organizational effect is caused by competition changes
and non-organizational synergies associated with the merger, which are internalized
by the merging parties immediately after the merger date. The organizational dis-
ruption effect is the impact of the post-merger organizational consolidation on the
firm’s ability to provide quality, and the effect only arises once the merging firms
begin their consolidation process (months after the merger date). The difference in
the timing of these effects allows us to separately identify them.
Specifically, we study three major airline mergers that took place in the last decade:
US Airways–America West, Delta–Northwest, and United–Continental.2 Numerous
statements in the popular media are consistent with post-merger difficulties. In May
2011, Richard Anderson, Delta’s former chief executive, commented on the challenges
created by airline mergers, “Everybody had come to the conclusion that these things
are too big, too complex and too unwieldy to manage.”3 In November 2012, nearly
two years after the United and Continental merger was approved, Jeffery A. Smisek,
United’s former chief executive, commented, “The integration of two airlines takes
years. It’s very complex.”4 Darryl Jenkins, Chairman of the American Aviation
Institute, said, “I have never seen an airline merger go smoothly.” Anecdotal evidence
supporting these claims include reports that the integration of the reservation system
of both United–Continental and U.S. Airways–America West caused a series of delays
1Any (new) air carrier in the U.S. must first obtain authorization from the De-
partment of Transportation (DOT) and the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA).
https://www.transportation.gov/policy/aviation-policy/licensing/US-carriers





and cancellations5, as well as reports that differences in both labor contracts and
work culture caused productivity disruptions following the U.S. Airways–America
West and Delta–Northwest mergers.6 Reports also suggest an increase in consumer
dissatisfaction following some of the recent airline mergers.7
Our analysis shows that the organizational consolidation after a merger signifi-
cantly impacts a firm’s ability to provide quality. The estimates suggest a 22 percent
increase in delay time caused by the carrier (i.e., delays that could have been avoided)
after the merging firms begin to consolidate. Non-organizational effects on product
quality are found to be modest relative to the effects caused by the organizational
effects. With respect to dynamics, the organizational disruption effect is found to
peak shortly after the merging firms begin their consolidation (a 100 percent increase
in delays caused by the carrier) and then fades over the course of approximately two
years. We find that the post-merger organizational consolidation may even per-
manently damage a firm’s ability to supply quality—e.g., the United-Continental
merger. In terms of whether the merging firms only adopt/inherit the best practices
of each firm, we find that a merged firm’s on-time performance does not always im-
prove relative to the on-time performance of the individual merging firms before the
merger. In fact, in the United-Continental merger, we find that United converged to
Continental’s relatively worse pre-merger on-time performance. These results sug-
gest that a merger will not necessarily lead to the “best of both worlds” in terms of
post-merger performance.
Our results suggest that firms should carefully assess the magnitude and duration
of a merger’s impact on productivity and performance before choosing to merge.
When the merging firms are heterogeneous in their productivities, managers should
evaluate which practices work well and avoid bringing bad practices into the newly
formed organization. A conservative back of the envelope calculation shows that
flight delays caused by the carriers as a consequence of the combining of operations
5See http://www.economist.com/blogs/gulliver/2012/03/united-continental-merger
6Kole and Lehn (2000) and http://www.post-gazette.com/business/businessnews/2006/04/02/Cultures-
actually-clash-in-US-Airways-America-West-merger/stories/200604020236
7See, for instance, http://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/15/business/despite-shake-up-at-top-
united-faces-steep-climb.html
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resulted in a $870 million dollars loss.8
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2.2 describes the merger activity in the
U.S. airline industry and presents anecdotal evidence on the various mergers effects.
Section 2.3 presents the data used for the empirical analysis, and Section 2.4 our
econometric model. In Section 2.5, we present results that quantify a prolonged
quality reduction caused by the merger and, lastly, in Section 2.6, we conclude.
Related literature
The effect of firm organization on firm performance is a longstanding question in
the management and organizations literature. Sales and Mirvis (1984) and Schein
(1996) attempt to conceptualize the culture of an organization, and Stahl and Voight
(2004) and King et al. (2004) perform a meta-analysis of the impact of cultural differ-
ences on post-merger performance. Industry-specific examples include Lodorfos and
Boateng (2006) in the chemical industry, and Saunders et al. (2009) in the hotel in-
dustry. Buono et al. (1985) studies a merger between two mutual savings banks and
uses qualitative methods to show that differences in organizational culture caused
post-merger difficulties (see Buono and Bowditch, 2003 for other examples). Datta
(1991) studies how differences in top management style impact a merger’s perfor-
mance. Given the prevalence of unsuccessful mergers, researchers have investigated
how to preempt post-integration difficulties (e.g, Graebner et al., 2016; Buono and
Bowditch, 2003).
Other researchers have studied the impact of airline mergers on market perfor-
mance and quality provision from various angles. Borenstein (1990) studies the
Northwest Airlines–Republic Airlines and Trans World Airlines–Ozark Airlines merg-
ers and presents evidence of price increases and service cutbacks on routes where the
merging partners had both operated prior to the merger. Similar results for these
mergers are presented in Werden et al. (1991). Kim and Singal (1993), Peters (2006),
and Kwoka and Shumilkina (2010) also present evidence of price increases caused by
these and other airline mergers. Carlton et al. (1980) measure how mergers benefit
consumers by increasing the number of city pair combinations with single-carrier
8This estimation combines our estimates with delay costs estimates in Ball et al. (2010).
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service. Borenstein and Netz (1999) study how competition affects departure time
differentiation both before and after deregulation. Mazzeo (2003) studies the rela-
tionship between competition and on-time performance, presenting evidence in favor
of more frequent and longer delays on routes with only one airline providing direct
service. Chen et al. (2013) and Prince and Simon (2014) study how mergers affect
the availability of non-stop flights and on-time performance, respectively. However,
none of these articles separate the merger effects between organizational and non-
organizational effects.
In terms of how product quality affects consumer choices in the airline industry,
Forbes (2008) presents evidence suggesting that on-time performance affects an air-
line’s ability to set higher prices. This is consistent with the evidence in Forbes et al.
(2015) on how airlines reallocate resources within the firm to avoid delays whenever
possible. Forbes and Lederman (2009) and Forbes and Lederman (2010) have also
studied how the economic benefits of greater on-time performance have incentivized
airlines to vertically integrate with regional carriers to improve their product quality.
Lastly, Mayer and Sinai (2003) argue that airlines increase congestion of flights at
certain hours to maximize the number of possible connections faced by a passenger at
their hub airports, which further suggests the importance to consumers of non-price
attributes of airlines.
2.2 Mergers in the U.S. airline industry
The U.S. airline industry has gone through several changes over the last 15 years. It
has experienced technological improvements, bankruptcies, new regulations, and—
more importantly for our analysis—mergers. As a result of the recent merger activity,
11 of the biggest U.S. airlines in 2004 (measured in terms of revenue) have consoli-
dated into 6 airlines.
We focus on three recent mergers: US Airways and America West, Delta and
Northwest, and United and Continental.9 With respect to the US Airways–America
9Other recent deals, excluded from our analysis due to limited post-merger data, are the mergers
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West merger, the Antitrust Division of the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) ar-
gued that the merger would not reduce competition and stated that “integration of
airlines with complementary, end-to-end networks, like those of the merging firms,
can achieve efficiencies that benefit consumers.”10 Regarding the Delta–Northwest
merger, the DOJ stated that “the Division has determined that the proposed merger
between Delta and Northwest is likely to produce substantial and credible efficien-
cies that will benefit U.S. consumers and is not likely to substantially lessen com-
petition.”11 Finally, United and Continental transferred “takeoff and landing rights
(slots) and other assets at Newark Liberty Airport to Southwest Airlines Co.” in
response to the DOJ’s competitive concerns.12
The timeline of airline mergers have two dates that are key for understanding
how the merging firms transition from separate entities to a single airline. The first
is the merger approval date (or merger date), which is when the merging airlines
become jointly owned.13 After this date, the airlines may coordinate their choices
about pricing, network structure, infrastructure, and other strategic dimensions. The
second is the date when industry regulators (i.e., DOT and FAA) issue the merging
airlines authorization to consolidate and operate as a single entity.14 As we show in
the next section, the time gap between these two dates can be longer than a year.
2.2.1 Organizational disruption effects
The operation of the airline industry relies heavily on the coordination of multiple
technological systems. Airlines must have reliable systems for communications, tick-
eting, flight scheduling, employees (pilots, flight attendants, suppliers) information,
maintenance, weather forecast, air traffic control, security, etc. All of these sys-





13The term “merger approval” is used because most airline merger proposals are scrutinized by
antitrust agencies due to potential competitive concerns before being approved.
14See Footnote 1.
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tems must operate in unison for the airlines to be productive in providing a timely
and reliable service to its customers. The process of consolidating two airlines re-
quires harmonizing all of these systems, which is a major organizational challenge
that may threaten firm performance. Because these challenges are inherent to the
process of consolidating organizations, these challenges should only impact on-time
performance after the date when industry regulators authorize the merging airlines
to consolidate. Despite taking preventive steps to avoid problems, all of the mergers
we examine suffered the consequences of unforeseen issues during their integration
processes. We call these organizational disruption effects.
US Airways and America West
The day-to-day management of the former US Airways and America West re-
mained, for the most part, independent until 2006 when the merged firms initiated
consolidation. At this point, organizational differences began to show. Almost three
years after the approval of the merger, pilots originally working for US Airways
unionized and confronted those who originally worked for America West. The newly
formed airline could not reach an agreement on a uniform contract for all pilots,
mostly due to disagreement over the new seniority system.15
Apart from these cultural differences, on March 4th, 2007, US Airways and Amer-
ica West combined their reservation systems. The airlines chose to implement the
system used by America West (EDS/SHARES ). The transition was not smooth; the
interaction between the reservation system and the ticketing stations at the airports
failed, creating chaos at the airports, long waiting lines, and passenger frustration.16
It has been argued that the reservation system used by US Airways (SABRE ) would









After the merger approval in October 2008, the airlines’ operations ran separately—
i.e., each airline used its own flight-codes, reservation systems and crew—until they
received a single operating certificate from the FAA on December 31st, 2009. Delta
implemented the technological changes in stages and hired extra staff in anticipation
to potential system crashes. The final Northwest flight took off in January 30, 2010.
After this date, all flight reservations were managed by Delta’s website.18 By the end
of the first quarter of 2010, Delta and Northwest’s systems were fully consolidated.
Similar to what happened after the merger between US Airways and America West,
two different work cultures clashed in the Delta–Northwest merger. Flight attendants
belonging to Delta and Northwest continued working on separate contracts long after
the merger. Delta’s flight attendants did not want to unionize, while Northwest’s
flight attendants wanted to be represented by a union—as they had been unionized
for 63 years before the merger took place.19 After voting in July, 2010, flight atten-
dants failed to unionize and their representatives accused the airline of “intimidation
tactics.” On the other hand, Delta and Northwest preempted a potential problem
by reaching an agreement with their pilots before the merger was approved. Initially,
Northwest pilots opposed the merger because they were concerned about the change
in seniority rankings after the merger. However, in August 2008, the airlines and
their pilots reached a collective agreement, which provided more confidence about
the prospects of the merger.
United and Continental
The United–Continental merger showed more problems during the consolidation
stage than the US Airways–America West and Delta–Northwest mergers. Most of
the problems were caused by the integration of the computer systems. In February,
2011, United grounded 96 aircraft for maintenance checks causing a series of delays.20
A few months later, on June 17, 2011, a computer system failure caused nation-
18http://aviationblog.dallasnews.com/2010/02/delta-reservation-systems-take.html/
19http://www.cbsnews.com/news/delta-flight-attendants-reject-unionization-following-
northwest-merger/ and also see http://labornotes.org/blogs/2010/11/flight-attendants-lose-delta
20http://dailycaller.com/2011/02/15/united-temporarily-grounds-96-aircraft/
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wide delays, affecting thousands of travelers.21 Perhaps to prevent further problems,
on March 3, 2012, United adopted Continental’s reservation and computer system,
which according to some experts, was older and less efficient.22 There were unforeseen
issues in the integration of the reservation and computer system, which resulted in
delays (e.g., days after the change, Chicago O’Hare’s on-time performance dropped to
16%).23 There were problems in kiosks and call centers, and the website collapsed.24
As a consequence of this inefficient system, the booking and ticketing process was
slow and a series of computer glitches continued causing flight delays long after
the integration. On August 28, 2012, United experienced a network outage of over
two hours, causing at least 200 delays and cancellations.25 On November 15, 2012, a
problem with the communication system caused hundred of delays across the country
and several cancellations.26
In addition to problems with the computer systems, labor relations have been
difficult after merger.27 Up to this day, more than 5 years after the merger, flight
attendants do not have a uniform contract. Flight attendants of former United and
Continental work as separate groups, generating internal labor frictions. This lack of
coordination creates challenges in scheduling crews and flights causing flight delays.28
21http://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/18/us/18united.html













2.2.2 Non-organizational merger effects
Mergers change strategic incentives along multiple dimensions: prices, on-time per-
formance, network structure, capital accumulation, etc. The date when a merger
is approved is the first date when these new incentives come into force, because
common ownership aligns incentives regardless of whether the merging airlines have
combined their operations. We document a series of events that reveal a change in
behavior among merging airlines immediately after the merger’s approval date, and
call these non-organizational merger effects.
In the following sections, we show evidence that merging airlines changed their
on-time performance as well as the number of routes they served immediately after
the merger approval. In the Appendix, we also show that the merging airlines made
changes to their stock of ground equipment, aircraft utilization, and aircraft fleet im-
mediately following the merger. This evidence suggests that the merging airlines did
in fact take actions to internalize the change of incentives after the merger approval
date. These effects, although important on their own, are not the main focus of this
paper.
2.3 Data and variables
We collected on-time performance data from the DOT’s Bureau of Transporta-
tion Statistics (BTS). The data are available beginning in January 1995 and cover
scheduled-service non-stop domestic flights in the U.S. by major air carriers.29 The
DOT requires that these carriers report on operations to and from the 29 U.S. air-
ports that account for at least 1% of the country’s total domestic scheduled-service
passenger boardings; however, all reporting airlines voluntarily provide data for their
entire domestic systems.
The data contain general information for each flight—flight number, date and time,
carrier, aircraft (tail number), origin airport, destination airport, and distance—as
29Carriers required to report on-time performance to the BTS are those that have at least 1%
of the total domestic scheduled-service passenger revenues.
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well as information on the timing of each flight—scheduled departure time, actual
departure time, scheduled arrival time, actual arrival time, among other variables.
The data also contain a number of on-time performance measures, such as departure
and arrival delays and cancellation information. The departure delay is calculated as
the difference between the scheduled departure time and the actual departure time
and, likewise, the arrival delay is calculated as the difference between the scheduled
arrival time and the actual arrival time.
Since June 2003, carriers are also required to report the reason for a flight delay or
cancellation. The reasons for delays or cancellations are classified into five categories:
air carrier, extreme weather, National Aviation System, late-arriving aircraft, and
security. For delayed flights, airlines report the number of minutes of the total arrival
delay are attributable to each category. The first category is the most relevant
for our analysis, since it identifies circumstances within the airline’s control that
cause delays—e.g., maintenance or crew problems, aircraft cleaning, baggage loading,
fueling, etc—and it reflects an organization’s ability to provide quality.
We use the BTS on-time performance data from January 2004 to December 2013,
which cover all flights starting two years before the U.S. Airways–America West
merger until two years after the United–Continental merger (see Table 2.1). The
data for this period contain information on 66,153,753 flights. We assign a flight-
code to each flight—which is a unique combination of an airline, origin, destination,
day of the week, and hour of the day—and restrict the sample to flight-codes that
appear at least 10 times in the sample period to be able to control for flight-code
fixed effects in our econometric models. This restriction reduces our sample size
to 65,427,075 flights (98.9% of the original sample size), which are classified into
630,407 flight-codes.30 Similarly, we drop date–destination airport combinations to
be able to include date–destination airport fixed effects in our analysis, leaving us
with 65,240,227 flights (98.6% of the original sample size).
Our variable of interest is the arrival delay caused by the carrier (which we call
“carrier delay”). This variable is not reported for flights with total delay time shorter
30146,231 observations have missing on-time performance data.
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Table 2.1: Dates for merger approval, jointly reporting and integration of
reservation systems. The gap between these dates is what we exploit to separate
the strategic and organizational effects.
Merger Merger Joint Integration
approval reporting of reserv. sys.
US Airways–America West Sep 27, 2005 Jan 1, 2006∗ Mar 4, 2007
Delta–Northwest Oct 29, 2008 Jan 1, 2010 Feb 1, 2010
United–Continental Oct 1, 2010 Jan 1, 2012 Mar 3, 2012
Note: US Airways and America West started to report combined on-time data in January 2006 and combined traffic
and financial data in October 2007. We consider January 2006 as the relevant date since from then on all America
West flights were branded as US Airways, along with most signage at airports and other printed material.
than 15 minutes, although the total delay time is reported for all flights.31 We deal
with this missing data problem for flights with delays shorter than 15 minutes in
two ways. As a first alternative, we assume that no part of the delay was caused
by the carrier, i.e., we assign a value of zero to the variable “carrier delay” for the
flights with delays shorter than 15 minutes. We call this new variable the “minimum”
carrier delay. As a second alternative, we attribute the full delay to the carrier, i.e.,
we assign a value total carrier delay to the variable “carrier delay.” We call this
new variable the “maximum” carrier delay. Note that since we observe the carrier
delay for flights delayed by more than 15 minutes, we do not need to impute any
information for these flights when defining the variables minimum and maximum
carrier delay. We use minimum carrier delay as our main dependent variable, as it
is more conservative. However, we show that our results are robust to using either
of these two definitions of carrier delay.
We also consider alternative measures of on-time performance in our analysis. We
construct the variable “travel time,” which is the time elapsed between the scheduled
departure time and the actual arrival time.32 This measure has the virtue of being
robust to airline manipulation, as it has been argued that airlines may manipulate
scheduled flight times to minimize the risk of delays (Prince and Simon, 2014). Other
31BTS calls a flight “on-time” when the delay time is shorter than 15 minutes (Forbes et al.,
2015).
32In our database, travel time is calculated as actual elapsed time plus departure delay.
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on-time performance variables we consider are cancellations caused by the carrier
(“carrier cancel”) and delays caused by a late aircraft (“late aircraft”). Finally, we
consider other measures of quality: the number of mishandled bags (from the BTS)
and the number of consumer complaints (from the Aviation Consumer Protection
Division, DOT), which are available at the airline–month–year level. As a robustness
check, we repeat our analysis using these alternative measures of quality provision.
Table 2.2 presents summary statistics for all the dependent variables used in our
analysis.
Table 2.2: Measures of quality, summary statistics.
Mean St. Dev. Min. Max.
(Min.) Arrival delay due to the carrier (minutes) 3.219 19.085 0.00 2580.00
(Max.) Arrival delay due to the carrier (minutes) 4.556 19.120 0.00 2580.00
Travel time (minutes) 135.831 78.896 0.00 2916.00
Cancellations due to the carrier (1=canceled flight) 0.007 0.084 0.00 1.00
(Min.) Arrival delay due to late aircraft (minutes) 4.245 19.275 0.00 1391.00
Complaints (per 100,000 passengers) 0.982 0.845 0.00 13.52
Mishandled baggage (per 1,000 passengers) 5.424 3.262 0.11 28.16
Note: Authors’ calculations based on BTS and Aviation Consumer Protection Division data, DOT.
Table 2.3 reports summary statistics for delays (measured as minimum carrier
delay), the number of flights, and the number of routes (i.e., defined as an origin
and destination combination). We report these statistics for the industry as a whole
as well as for the merging airlines. For each of the mergers, we separately report
these statistics for the period before the merger approval (Column 1), the period
between the merger approval and the combining of operations (Column 2), and for
the period after the merging firms combine operations (Column 3). We use the date
when the merging airlines begin jointly reporting on-time performance data to BTS
as a measure of the date when the merging airlines combine their operations (see
Table 2.1). We choose this date because it marks the beginning of organizational
consolidation.33
33In all mergers, the merging airlines start to jointly report on-time performance on the same
day or before the date when the FAA approves the single operating certificate, and also before the
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Table 2.3 shows that for the first two mergers (US Airways–America West and
Delta–Northwest), the share of delayed flights, the average delay, and the average
delay of delayed flights decreased after the merger approval and then increased af-
ter the merging airlines combined operations. For United–Continental, the delayed
flights and the average delay increased both after the merger approval and after the
combining operations, although more abruptly after the latter event. Figure 2.1
adds to this analysis by showing the distribution of delays caused by the carrier both
one year before the merger approval date and in the second year after the merger
approval date—where the latter period captures both non-organizational and orga-
nizational disruption effects. The figure shows that the post-merger distributions
first-order stochastically dominate the pre-merger distributions. These patterns in
Table 2.3 and Figure 2.1 jointly suggest that the mergers had a negative impact on
firm performance.
Table 2.3: Summary statistics before and after merger.
US Airways & Delta & United Airlines &
All America West Northwest Continental
(1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3)
% delayed flights 0.112 0.128 0.098 0.142 0.126 0.099 0.113 0.079 0.090 0.131
Avg delay 3.22 2.89 2.13 3.21 4.14 3.17 3.54 2.53 2.79 3.77
Avg delay of delayed 34.08 26.04 25.09 25.13 37.35 35.83 37.09 38.49 36.80 31.79
Avg monthly flights 554875 51964 47022 39975 71344 60233 60746 50910 46566 42793
Total routes 6168 604 520 544 942 807 846 589 582 605
Avg monthly routes 4093 511 478 416 776 629 611 499 499 481
Avg monthly flights from/to hubs 0.330 0.491 0.510 0.577 0.553 0.602 0.644 0.467 0.460 0.469
Routes always competed before . 6 6 6 6 6 6 14 14 14
Routes competed at least once . 8 8 8 16 16 16 18 18 18
Note: The measure of delays is arrival delay due to the carrier (min.). The first column reports figures for all the
airlines during the full period (2004-2013). For each of the mergers, Column (1) reports figures for the period before
merger approval, Column (2) for the period between merger approval and the combination of operations, and Column
(3) for the period after they combine operations, as presented in Figure 2.3. We use the date when the merging
airlines start to jointly report on-time performance data to FAA as our measure of the date of the combination of
operations. The last two lines refer to routes operated by both merging airlines (i.e., both had at least one flight) in
every month before the merger or at least in one month before the merger approval, respectively.
The data also provide us with an opportunity to describe the evolution of market
structure. Using the distance of each flight, we construct airline market shares based
airlines integrate their reservation systems. We consider an alternative measure for the date when
the merging parties combine operations when discussing robustness in the Section 2.5.
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Panel C: United & Continental
Note: The measure of delays is arrival delay due to the carrier (min.). The “before” curve plots the distribution of
delays due to the carrier one year before the merger approval date. The “after” curve plots the distribution of delays
due to the carrier in the second year after the merger approval date.
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on total distance covered in a year. Table 2.2 shows a ranking of airlines by their
market shares in 2004 (before the mergers) and in 2013 (after the mergers). The
figure shows that the combined share of the four largest carriers increased from 2004
to 2013, which is consistent with industry consolidation. In terms of the impact of
the mergers on route-level competition, the last two rows of Table 2.3 report the
number of routes where the merging airlines had overlap before their mergers. Using
two alternative criteria, we show that the merging airlines had little overlap before
their mergers (i.e., in less than 4% of the routes served by the merging airlines),
which is consistent with the DOJ claims on the competitive implications of these
mergers.34
Figure 2.2: Airlines ranked by total distance covered, 2004 and 2013.
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Notes:: Authors’ calculations based on BTS data.
2.4 Econometric model
Our econometric analysis is based on a differences-in-differences design, where we
compare the change in the merging airlines’ on-time performance (treatment) with
34The first of these rows reports the number of routes where the merging airlines had overlap in
every month prior to the merger, while the second reports the number of routes where the merging
airlines had overlap in at least one month prior to the merger.
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the change in the on-time performance of the rest of the industry (control).35 The
simplest formulation of our econometric model is
Delayardt = β · afterd ·mergeda + φ · afterd + γ ·mergeda + x′ardtµ+ εardt, (2.1)
where Delayardt is the carrier delay for the flight operated by airline a, covering route
r (defined as an origin airport–destination airport combination), at date d, and time
t. afterd is an indicator variable that takes the value 1 if the date of the flight is
after the date of the merger, mergeda indicates whether the airline that operates the
flight is one of the merging carriers, xardt is a vector of controls, and εardt is an error
term clustered at the route level. β is our main coefficient of interest, as it measures
the change in on-time performance of the merging airlines after their merger.
While the coefficient β in equation (2.1) measures the overall change in the merg-
ing airlines’ on-time performance, it does not separate non-organizational effects (i.e.,
effects that take place after the merger approval) from organizational disruption ef-
fects (i.e., effects that take place only after the merging firms combine operations).
As mentioned previously, we use the date when the merging airlines begin jointly
reporting on-time performance to the BTS as our measure of the date of organiza-
tional consolidation, since it is the earliest in a series of integration milestones.36 In
Table 2.1 we show the merger approval dates, the date when the merging airlines
start jointly reporting on-time performance data, and the integration of reservation
systems dates for each of the three mergers. Given that the date of the combin-
ing of operations is later than the merger approval date, we can separately identify
the non-organizational effects and organizational disruption effects using indicator







φi ·afterid+γ ·mergeda+x′ardtµ+εardt, (2.2)
where s stands for merger approval date, and c for the date of the combining of
35In Subsection 2.5.3 we change the control group as a robustness check.
36See Footnote 33.
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operations. βs and βc are our coefficients of interest. βs captures the change in on-
time performance of the merging airlines after the merger approval date but before
the combining of operations; βc captures the incremental effect of on-time perfor-
mance after the merging airlines have combined operations. We interpret βs as the
coefficient measuring non-organizational effects, and βc as the coefficient measuring
organizational disruption effects.
In the vector xardt we include flight-code and date–destination airport fixed effects,
where a flight-code is defined as a carrier–origin–destination–day-of-week–hour-of-
day combination (e.g., Monday 9AM flight from ORD to MIA operated by AA).
The flight-code fixed effects measure systematic differences across flights in on-time
performance. Controlling for flight-code fixed effects is key, as airlines modify their
network of flights over time, which could make it difficult to measure the impact
of a merger on quality. For instance, if two merging airlines dropped flight-codes
with poor on-time performance after their merger, one would conclude from a simple
before-and-after comparison that the merging airlines increased their on-time per-
formance after the merger. However, that post-merger on-time performance effect
would at least in part be driven by the airlines dropping poor-performing flight-codes.
By including the flight-code fixed effects, we measure the impact of the merger on on-
time performance relative to the systematic performance of each flight-code, which
is robust to changes in the network of flights. That is, even if there is a change in the
composition of flights, our estimates for post-merger effects would be zero unless the
merging airlines change their on-time performance at the flight-code level. Lastly,
the date–destination airport fixed effects absorb idiosyncratic shocks specific to a
destination airport on a given day, which may include weather, congestion, or other
factors affecting on-time performance.
We estimate these differences-in-differences models for each merger separately and
also pooling all the mergers together. In the latter case, afterd · mergeda takes the
value 1 for flights operated by any airline that has been part of one of the three
mergers. For ease of notation, we label the mergers as UA (US Airways–America





































d + ξark(d)h(t) + τdest(r)d + εardt,
where m ∈ {UA,DN,UC, {UA,DN,UC}}, ξark(d)h(t) is a flight-code fixed effect (i.e.,
an effect specific to flights operated by airline a, in route r, in day of the week k,
at hour of the day h), and τdest(r)d is a date–destination airport fixed effect. We do
not include the term γ ·mergeda since these variables are absorbed by the flight-code
fixed effects.37,38 When analyzing each merger separately (m ∈ {UA,DN,UC}), we
restrict the sample to 5-year periods around each of the mergers (see Figure 2.3).
When pooling all the mergers, we use the entire dataset. In the pooled case, we
define afterm,cd (m = {UA,DN,UC}) in equation (2.4) as an indicator that takes
the value 1 until two years after the date of the combining of operations of m, and
afterm,sd as an indicator that takes the value 1 starting from the merger approval date
until two years after the date of the combining of operations.
Finally, we study the dynamics of the impact of these mergers on on-time perfor-
mance. To analyze these patterns, we estimate the month–year level time-effects on
carrier delay using the following equation
Delayardt = β
m
my · τmy(d) ·mergedma + ξark(d)h(t) + τdest(r)d + εardt. (2.5)
βmmy in equation (2.5) measures the differential performance of the merging airlines
with respect to the rest of the carriers in a given month–year. We make use of the
37We treat the merging airlines as a single airline throughout the period of study when defining
the flight-codes.
38The term φ · afterd is not necessarily absorbed by the month-year fixed effects because afterd
is defined at the date (i.e., day) level.
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Figure 2.3: Regression ranges by merger.
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Note: Range of dates for each merger in our analysis. A stands for the approval date of the merger, J for the date
from which airlines began jointly reporting, and I for the date used as the beginning of the integration of operations.
estimates for βmmy to measure the length and magnitude of organizational disruption
effects, as well as to argue that there are no pre-trends that may compromise the
interpretation of our differences-in-differences results.
Similarly, to analyze post-merger organizational synergies we decompose the merger
effects by the identity of the airline that operated each flight before the merger (equa-
tion 2.6). Distinguishing between airlines allows us to measure the evolution of the
relative performance of flights operated (or formerly operated) by each of the merging
airlines, study whether the on-time performance of the merging airlines converged,
and whether they converged for the better or worse.
Delayardt = β
m1
my ·τmy(d) ·mergedm1a +βm2my ·τmy(d) ·mergedm2a +ξark(d)h(t) +τdest(r)d+εardt.
(2.6)
2.5 Results
2.5.1 Measuring post-merger organizational disruption
How do mergers impact the every-day business of the firm? Are these effects tem-
poral or permanent? We approach these questions by using differences-in-differences
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designs to quantify the impact of mergers on firm productivity and performance
using measures of on-time performance at the intra-day level. We make use of a
unique timing of events that allows us to separate non-organizational effects from
organizational disruption effects: there is a time gap between the merger approval
date and the date when the merging airlines receive regulatory approval to consoli-
date operations. We use the date when the merging airlines start jointly reporting
on-time performance data to BTS as our measure for the date of the combining of
operations.39 Any impact on measures of on-time performance that is observed af-
ter the merger approval but before the combining of operations capture competition
effects as well as potential synergies unrelated to organizational culture (i.e., non-
organizational effects), as the organizations remain separate in conducting every-day
business in this time period. We call any incremental effect on the measures of
on-time performance observed after the combining of operations an organizational
disruption effect, because this effect is specific to when the organizational challenges
come into effect.
Figure 2.4 shows estimates for equation (2.5), where we estimate the differential
performance of the merging airlines with respect to the rest of the industry over
time. Except for the United–Continental merger, there are no noticeable on-time
performance changes between the dates of the merger approval and the combining
of operations. However, after the merging airlines combined operations, on-time
performance worsened in all cases, suggesting that the organizational disruption
caused by the mergers had an impact on the merging airlines’ ability to provide
quality. At the peak of the effect, the average delay caused by the carrier was 3
to 4 minutes greater than that in the pre-merger period (i.e., about 100 percent
of the industry average). The figure suggests that the organizational disruption
effect lasted between 1 to 2 years for these merging firms, after which most airlines
returned to their pre-merger on-time performance levels. The exception is United,
which experienced a permanent decrease in its on-time performance.
The figures also show no pre-trends in the months before the combining of op-
erations that may affect the interpretation of our results in the Delta–Northwest
39See Footnote 33.
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and United–Continental mergers. For the US Airways–America West merger, we
observe a pre-merger negative trend that may affect our non-organizational effect
estimates for that merger. However, even if we restrict attention to the Delta–
Northwest and United–Continental mergers, our results for the relative magnitude
of non-organizational and organizational disruption effects below remain unchanged.
Table 2.4 summarizes our estimates in Figure 2.4 using a regression analysis with
fewer parameters. Column 1 shows estimates for equation (2.3), where we measure
the impact of mergers on on-time performance using a single post-merger indica-
tor that takes a value of 1 starting from the merger approval date. This exercise
provides a measure that combines both post-merger non-organizational and organi-
zational disruption effects and can be interpreted as the overall effect of a merger on
quality. When analyzing each merger separately, we find heterogeneous effects. After
the US Airways–America West merger, the merging carriers improved their on-time
performance by 0.4 minutes or 12 percent of the industry average, which suggests
efficiency gains. The impact on quality for Delta–Northwest was negative, with an
average increase in delays caused by the carrier of 0.31 minutes or 9.3 percent of
the industry average. For the United–Continental merger, we find that the merging
airlines on average reduced their on-time performance by 0.54 minutes or 18 percent
of the industry average. When pooling data for all mergers, we estimate that the
overall effect of a merger on delays caused by the airlines was 0.33 minutes or 10
percent of the industry average. That is, we find that on average a merger worsens
on-time performance though the analysis does suggest heterogeneous effects across
mergers.40
In Column 2 of Table 2.4, we show estimates for equation (2.4), where we in-
clude a post-merger approval indicator as well as an indicator that takes the value
1 after the merging airlines have combined operations. Including both of these in-
dicators in the regressions allows us to distinguish between non-organizational and
organizational disruption effects. The table shows that after US Airways–America
40The coefficients are small because they are averages over all flights, many of which experienced
no delays. When one scales the coefficients by the share of delayed flights, the magnitudes roughly
increase by a factor of 10.
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Note: Solid lines represent coefficients βmmy from equation 2.5. Dashed lines are 95% confidence intervals using
standard errors clustered at the route level. A unit of observation is an individual flight. All regressions include
flight code and date–destination fixed effects, as defined in Section 2.4. Solid bar: merger approval date, dashed
bar: date of combination of operations (joint reporting), dotted bar: integration of reservation system, as reported
in Table 2.1.
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Table 2.4: Effect of mergers on quality provision: difference-in-differences analysis.
Panel A: US Airways & America West
(I) (II)
After date of merger approval * UA -0.405∗∗∗ -0.889∗∗∗
(0.063) (0.076)





Panel B: Delta & Northwest
After date of merger approval * DN 0.307∗∗∗ 0.094
(0.081) (0.079)





Panel C: United Airlines & Continental
After date of merger approval * UC 0.541∗∗∗ -0.013
(0.061) (0.050)





Panel D: All mergers
After date of merger approval * merged 0.327∗∗∗ -0.136∗∗∗
(0.035) (0.038)





Note: Standard errors clustered at the route level in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. A unit
of observation is an individual flight. The dependent variable is carrier delay (min.), as defined in Section 2.3. All
regressions include flight code and date–destination fixed effects, as defined in Section 2.4. The coefficients reported




c from equation (2.4) with m = UA,
DN , UC, and {UA,DN,UC} for Panels A, B, C, and D, respectively. See Section 2.4 for variable definitions.
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West, Delta–Northwest, and United–Continental combined their operations, the de-
lays caused by the carriers increased by 0.56, 0.39, and 1.09 minutes, respectively
(or, 17, 12, and 35 percent of the industry average). The difference with the US
Airways–America West merger relative to the others is that the organizational dis-
ruption effect partially reversed efficiency gains that the merging airlines realized
after their merger approval. When pooling data for all mergers, the estimated in-
crease in delays caused by post-merger organizational disruption was 0.7 minutes or
22 percent of the industry average. These results suggest that the organizational
disruption effect—and not strategic choices by the merged airlines—can explain the
post-merger decrease in quality. The pooled results also suggest an increase in on-
time performance immediately after the mergers were approved, though this effect is
small relative to the organizational disruption effect and seems to be driven entirely
by the US Airways–America West merger.
As discussed in the previous section, all of the specifications include flight-code
fixed effects (i.e., carrier–origin–destination–day-of-week–hour-of-day combination
fixed effects), which measure systematic on-time performance differences across flights.
Controlling for flight-code fixed effects help us rule out that our results may be driven
by a post-merger change in the composition of flights. That is, even if there is a
change in the composition of flights, our estimates for post-merger effects would be
zero unless the merging airlines change their on-time performance at the flight-code
level. One may also worry that the mergers may have caused changes in market
structure at the route level (i.e., entry or exit of other carriers) that may be affect-
ing the interpretation of our results. Additionally, post-merger changes in aircraft
utilization may be in part driving our results.
To address concerns raised by concurrent changes in both market structure and
aircraft utilization, we replicate Panel D of Table 2.4 in Table 2.5 with additional
controls for the number of airlines serving each route in a given month–year combi-
nation (Column 1) and the month–year utilization rate of the flight aircraft as well
as aircraft model fixed effects (Column 2). Column 1 shows that controlling for the
number of airlines serving a route does not change the coefficients on the post-merger
indicators in any meaningful way, suggesting that changes in market structure that
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are concurrent to the mergers are not driving our results. The table also shows a
negative coefficient on the number of airlines serving a route, which suggests that
there are fewer avoidable delays in routes where there is more competition. Column
2 shows that controlling for aircraft utilization and aircraft model fixed effects does
not affect our results either.
In Table 2.5 we explore differential merger effects by including specifications for
whether a flight lands or departs from one of the carriers’ hubs (Column 3) and by
whether a flight lands and departs in one of the 20 highest traffic airports (Column
4). The results suggest that there are no differential non-organizational nor organi-
zational disruption effects. The results do suggest greater organizational disruption
effects in large airports. However, the bulk of the organizational disruption effect is
uniform across airport size.
In summary, we find that mergers on average worsen quality and that the bulk
of that effect is explained by post-merger organizational disruption. While the or-
ganizational disruption effect is temporal, it may last for more than two years after
the merger approval and even result in permanent losses (e.g., United). We end
the section by noting that there is anecdotal evidence suggesting that the merging
airlines faced organizational challenges even before the date that serves as our mea-
sure of when the airlines combined operations. For instance, in June 2011, United
experienced a computational problem that created widespread delays and flight can-
cellations, which, as shown in Figure 2.4, coincides with a seemingly permanent
increase in average delays due to the carrier.41 Similarly, Delta announced in August
2009 that it was going to cut management jobs and Northwest reported to the FAA
a decrease in employees in September 2009, both of which coincide with an increase
in average delays due to the carrier for these airlines.42 While these anecdotes do
not affect our overall measure of how these mergers impacted on-time performance,
they bias our estimates for non-organizational and organizational disruption effects
upwards and downwards, respectively. This further reinforces the importance of
41See http://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/18/us/18united.html? r=0
42See http://www.cleveland.com/business/index.ssf/2009/08/delta air lines will cut more.html
and Figure B.5 in the Appendix.
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Table 2.5: Number of competitors, aircraft utilization, and hub flights.
(I) (II) (III) (IV)
After approval * merged -0.120∗∗∗ -0.122∗∗∗ -0.138∗∗∗ -0.085∗
(0.038) (0.039) (0.053) (0.044)
After comb. op. * merged 0.698∗∗∗ 0.710∗∗∗ 0.740∗∗∗ 0.612∗∗∗
(0.043) (0.042) (0.067) (0.050)




Aircraft’s years of service 0.000
(0.000)
After approval * merged * hub -0.024
(0.082)
After comb. op. * merged * hub 0.004
(0.092)
After approval * merged * big airport -0.111
(0.080)
After comb. op. * merged * big airport 0.239∗∗∗
(0.083)
R2 0.0432 0.0495 0.0432 0.0432
Observations 65,240,287 54,944,137 65,240,287 65,240,287
Ȳ 3.218 3.160 3.218 3.218
Note: Standard errors clustered at the route level in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. A unit
of observation is an individual flight. The dependent variable is carrier delay (min.), as defined in Section 2.3. All
regressions include flight code and date–destination fixed effects, as defined in Section 2.4. Results in column (II)
also incorporate aircraft model fixed effects. “Number of competitors” is the number of airlines that had at least
one flight in a route–month. “Air time” is an aircraft’s total air time in a given month (in thousands of minutes).
“Hub” is an indicator for flights that depart from (arrive at) the main hub of the airline.
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organizational disruption for understanding the impact of mergers on quality.
2.5.2 Do firms reinforce each other?
Are there post-merger organizational synergies? Does the new organization inherit
the best (or worst) practices of each of the merging firms? We address these questions
by using a similar approach to the previous subsection, but decomposing the merger
effects by the identity of the airline that operated each flight before the merger.
For instance, if prior to the merger Delta operated an Atlanta–Miami flight every
Monday at 9AM and Northwest did not, we classify that flight as a “Delta” flight.43
Distinguishing between airlines allows us to measure the evolution of the relative
performance of flights operated (or formerly operated) by each of the merging air-
lines, study whether the on-time performance of the merging airlines converged, and
whether the merged firm improved relative to the pre-merger performance of the
merging firms.
Figure 2.5 shows estimates for equation (2.6), where we estimate the differential
performance of the merging airlines with respect to the rest of the industry over
time, but now distinguishing between which of the merging airlines operated the
flight before the merger. The figure shows that airlines were heterogeneous before
their respective mergers. For instance, America West and United were equally or
more efficient (on average) than US Airways and Continental before their mergers,
suggesting room for organizational efficiencies. In terms of whether these organi-
zational synergies were realized, we find mixed evidence. On the one hand, United
seems to have converged to the (relatively worse) on-time performance of Continental
after consolidation, suggesting that United kept the worst of both organizations after
its merger and a best of both worlds scenario is not a given. On the other hand, we
also see that former US Airways and Northwest flights preserved their better on-time
performance after their consolidation, suggesting limited synergies and the potential
coexistence of two cultures within each of these two organizations.
43Since in these mergers there was limited route overlap between merging airlines, the classifi-
cation of flights is mostly unambiguous.
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Note: Solid lines represent coefficients βm1my and β
m2
my from equation 2.6. Dashed lines are 95% confidence intervals
using standard errors clustered at the route level. A unit of observation is an individual flight. All regressions include
flight code and date–destination fixed effects, as defined in Section 2.4. Solid bar: merger approval date, dashed bar:
the date of the combination of operations (joint reporting), dotted bar: integration of reservation system, as reported
in Table 2.1.
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Lastly, in Table 2.6 we examine the correlation of the time coefficients reported
in Figure 2.5, before and after the merging airlines combined operations. The table
suggests that after the combining of operations, the on-time performance of flights
operated by each former airline became more synchronized, suggesting that they
started experiencing similar performance shocks only after they consolidated opera-
tions. This evidence provides support for our identification strategy for measuring
organizational disruption effects, as firm productivity only became highly correlated
after organizational consolidation. Combined with Figure 2.5, Table 2.6 also suggests
that there are cultures within an organization that are better suited for handling the
same performance shock (e.g., former Northwest flights versus former Delta flights).
Table 2.6: Correlation of time effects for merging airlines.
UA DN UC
Before 0.003 -0.171 0.197
(0.989) (0.326) (0.256)
After 0.816*** 0.813*** 0.914***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Note: Figures are the correlation coefficients between βm1my and β
m2
my from equation 2.6, for each merger (plotted in
Figure 2.5). Correlations are reported before and after the combination of operations.
2.5.3 Robustness
We consider a series of robustness checks. First, we use an alternative measure for the
date of the combining of operations: the date when the merging airlines integrated
their reservation systems. Integrating reservation systems is a key milestone in the
process of combining operations. Table B.3 in the Appendix replicates Table 2.4
using this alternative measure, and shows that our coefficients do not qualitatively
change in a significant way.
In a second set of robustness exercises, we repeat our analysis using alternative
measures of on-time performance. Table 2.7 reports the results of our analysis when
using the full set of on-time performance variables described in Section 2.3 as our
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dependent variables. Overall, we find the same patterns as in Table 2.4. When using
the maximum carrier delay, we find no evidence of a non-organizational effect but
do find an organizational disruption effect that lowers on-time performance by 16
percent of the industry average. When using travel time, we find a small positive
non-organizational effect and an organizational disruption effect of almost 2 percent
of the industry average. When using cancellations caused by the carrier, we find
evidence in favor of efficiency gains immediately after the merger and then an increase
in cancellations of 43 percent (of the industry average). Lastly, when using delays
caused by late aircrafts, we find evidence of a small negative non-organizational effect
and an organizational disruption effect of 21 percent of the industry average.
Table 2.7: Effect of mergers on other measures of on-time performance.
Carrier delay Travel Carrier Late
(max.) time canceled aircraft
After approval * merged -0.149∗∗∗ -0.127 -0.002∗∗∗ -0.437∗∗∗
(0.043) (0.160) (0.000) (0.059)
After comb. op. * merged 0.725∗∗∗ 2.901∗∗∗ 0.003∗∗∗ 0.880∗∗∗
(0.050) (0.150) (0.000) (0.048)
R2 0.0457 0.8299 0.0439 0.1098
Observations 65,240,288 65,240,287 66,548,957 65,240,287
Ȳ 4.556 135.851 0.007 4.245
Note: Standard errors clustered at the route level in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. A unit of
observation is an individual flight. The dependent variables are indicated in column heads (see definitions in Section
2.3). All regressions include flight code and date–destination fixed effects, as defined in Section 2.4. The coefficients
reported are βms and β
m
c from equation (2.4) with m = {UA,DN,UC}. The regressions pool all mergers and include
all the data. See Table B.5 for the individual merger results.
Finally, we repeat our analysis using measures of quality other than on-time per-
formance: customer complaints and mishandled bags. Both of these measures are
reported at the airline–month level. Table B.4 in the Appendix reports the results of
this analysis. When pooling all mergers, we find that a merger on average increases
customer complaints and mishandled bags by 90 and 27 percent of the industry av-
erage, respectively. These results are in line with the previous findings, which show
that mergers reduce quality levels. Interestingly, we find that the organizational dis-
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ruption effect is less important for these alternative measures of quality, though it
still is found to have an effect.
2.6 Conclusions
Mergers disrupt organizations and this can lead to large efficiency losses. We quantify
the losses created by the consolidation of organizations by analyzing three recent
mergers in the U.S. airline industry. We exploit the timing of the milestones that
carriers must complete to become a single entity to separate between organizational
effects—e.g., integration of systems or employees contracts— and non-organizational
effects—e.g., pricing strategies, network of flights. Our main findings are two-fold.
First, the organizational consolidation is a disruptive process (as expected). However,
this is not a fleeting effect with minor consequences on quality provision. In fact, we
show this effect is lasting and significantly lowers performance. Second, the merged
firm may not be able to preserve the pre-merger performance of the best performing
firm.
Our results suggest that if integration plans are not well-thought-out, firms may
have to unexpectedly spend a large amount of resources to deal with post-merger
integration problems. Back of the envelope calculations show that the mergers we
analyze generated losses of about $870 million dollars due to organizational inefficien-
cies, which is a conservative lower bound. Merging firms should carefully assess how




NEW GOODS WITH NEW ATTRIBUTES:
ASSESSING THE EFFECT OF A NOVEL
QUALITY LABEL IN THE FOOD INDUSTRY
Joint with Victoria Lacaze
3.1 Introduction
Food safety and food quality concerns have increased worldwide among consumers in
the last decades, mainly in developed countries but growingly in developing ones. As
a consequence, some food-producing firms have begun requiring farmers to accom-
plish certain quality standards. This is the case of the processed potato industry in
Argentina, where some transnational companies have started to demand Argentinean
potato producers to implement Good Agricultural Practices (GAP) protocols, in or-
der to fulfill global supermarket chains requirements. The products obtained through
these practices possess a new attribute, the quality certification, which is not iden-
tified in their packages when sold in Argentinean domestic markets. However, these
firms could extract more consumer surplus by correctly signaling the GAP attribute
through a labeling strategy, since previous results indicate that local consumers are
willing to pay an extra price for potatoes that are produced by following sustainable
agricultural practices (Rodŕıguez et al., 2010).
The effects of the introduction of a new product, like a GAP-labeled processed
potato, can be analyzed by estimating a Random Coefficients Discrete Choice Model
(RCDCM) of demand (Berry, 1994; Berry et al., 1995). This model has gained im-
portance in the study of market power, changes in market structure, and introduction
of new goods in differentiated product markets. Petrin (2002) quantifies the effect of
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the introduction of the minivan into the U.S. automobile market. Mojduszka et al.
(2001) investigate preferences for prepared frozen meals and evaluate the impact of
a new government regulation policy that changes nutrition labeling from voluntary
to mandatory. Kim (2004) evaluates the effect of new brands on market competi-
tion and consumer welfare in the U.S. processed cheese market. In these studies,
the method allows to evaluate the introduction of a new product defined as a new
combination of existing characteristics, i.e. those included in the demand estimation
that requires sales data. The main difference between those and this paper is that
we evaluate the introduction of a new product with an inexperienced or unknown
attribute (i.e., an attribute that has not been supplied in the market before), namely
the GAP label. Therefore, the influence of this attribute on the utility function
cannot be recovered with sales data, but requires the use of an auxiliary dataset.
The Argentinean processed potato industry is characterized by high concentration
and high degree of horizontal and vertical differentiation. There are virtually no
research on the characteristics, evolution, and development of the domestic market.
Few exceptions are studies committed to analyze contractual relationships and inte-
gration schemes between potato producers and agro-industry stakeholders (Bruzone,
1998; Mateos, 2003). A more recent study (González and Lacaze, 2012) analyzes the
demand of frozen fried potatoes (FFP) in an important city of Argentina, Mar del
Plata, and the effect of hypothetical changes in market structure on prices, market
shares, and consumer welfare.
The objective of this paper is to evaluate the effect on market shares and con-
sumer surplus of the introduction of a GAP-labeled product in the FFP market.
To achieve this goal, we first estimate a RCDCM of household demand in Mar del
Plata, Argentina, using a scanner data panel provided by a local supermarket chain
and demographic information from an official household survey. In a second step,
we postulate a hypothetical scenario in which a properly labeled FFP produced fol-
lowing GAP standards is available as an option in the market. Using the estimated
price coefficient in the utility function and prior information about consumers’ de-
clared willingness to pay (WTP) for sustainably produced potatoes, we recover the
effect of the new attribute on utility, and then we assess the potential effect of the
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new product on sales and welfare. The methodological contribution of this paper
is to combine the strengths of both revealed- and stated-preferences approaches to
evaluate the market effect of a new product with a new attribute, a task that could
not be performed accurately with neither of them separately.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. A brief overview of the FFP world
market and some notes about the implementation of sustainable agricultural prac-
tices, including GAP and Integrated Production and Pest Management (IPPM) pro-
tocols, are presented in Section 3.2. Section 3.3 outlines the theoretical framework,
the RCDCM of demand. Data, estimation details, and identifying assumptions are
presented in Section 3.4. Section 3.5 reports the results. Finally, Section 3.6 con-
cludes the paper.
3.2 The FFP industry and the implementation of
sustainable production protocols
Potato is an extensive annual crop of relative high cost, whose productivity can
be limited by agro-ecological conditions, water availability, technology, and use of
fertilizers and other agrochemicals. These constraints are especially important when
considering potatoes destined to processing, as FFP, due to the quality standards
usually required. Straight-cut fries, named “papas bastón” in Argentina and some
other Latin American countries, are the main product of Argentinean FFP industry,
even though there are others, like slices, noisettes, croquettes, etc.
FFP is an extensively consumed food in developed countries, mainly in North
America. Although the FFP market has reached maturity in the United States,
a swiftly grow in developing countries is related to the higher women’s labor force
participation rates, the higher frequency of eating-out, and other changes in working
patterns. These modifications have caused a rise in the demand for fast food, a mar-
ket dominated by multinational chains that are the principal FFP supplier. Global
production of fries is mainly concentrated in the United States, The Netherlands,
Canada, and Belgium, which also are the top exporters. A few companies dominate
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this market in Mercosur: McCain supplies McDonald’s, while Alimentos Modernos
supplies Burger King through two own brands, FarmFrites and RapiPap. In Ar-
gentina, FFP production amounted to 215,000 tons in 2001 (last available figures),
accounting for 80% of the potatoes destined to industrial processing (Mateos, 2003).
Argentinean households’ direct demand for FFP is primarily supplied by super and
hypermarkets, even though restricted because of the high prices if compared with
fresh potatoes.
Some of the firms mentioned above have begun an adaptation process in order
to enforce their potato local suppliers to fulfill GAP protocols. According the Food
and Agricultural Organization of the United Nations, GAP refers to practices that
address environmental, economic and social sustainability for on-farm processes, and
result in safe and quality food and non-food agricultural products (Food and of the
United Nations , FAO). GAP help reduce the risk of non-compliance with national
and international regulations, standards, and guidelines regarding permitted pesti-
cides, maximum levels of contaminants in food and non-food agricultural products,
as well as other contamination hazards. One of the challenges involving the appli-
cation of GAP is the implementation of practices which lead to improvements in
terms of yield and production efficiencies as well as environment, health and safety
of workers. One approach to overcome this challenge is IPPM, a system developed
to address health and environmental concerns by decreasing the net chemical pes-
ticide inputs to agriculture (Bruhn et al., 1992). IPPM introduction propounds a
feasible and cost effective alternative to both conventional and organic agriculture
(Hamilton, 1995; Robson et al., 1995).
In the context of a national project launched in 2006 by the Argentinean National
Institute of Agricultural Technology (INTA), previous works have analyzed the possi-
bilities and limitations of the implementation of these sustainable practices to potato
production in the southeast Province of Buenos Aires, Argentina (Rodŕıguez et al.,
2010; González and Rodŕıguez, 2011). The main objective of that project is to
develop agronomic technologies that enable to produce, certify, and market fresh
potatoes by following sustainable agricultural practices. The successful adoption of
such technologies and sustainable practices by potato farmers is a key condition for
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the fulfillment of the project, but another critical task is consumers’ recognition of
and WTP for this kind of products with a novel quality certification attribute. The
last depends on the product labeling strategy in order to make visible this credence
attribute (Nelson, 1970). Previous empirical studies of the effects of voluntary or
mandatory product labeling in the food sector have tended to focus on the provision
of nutritional information and exhibit diverse results regarding effectiveness of infor-
mation disclosure (Ippolito and Mathios, 1995; Mojduszka and Caswell, 2000; Teisl
et al., 2001; Drichoutis et al., 2009). Overall, results are very mixed ranging from
substantial price premiums and sizable consumer segments for the labeled product,
to no avoidance behavior (Marks et al., 2003).
In the last decades, food safety scares have certainly led to a significant loss of
consumer confidence in the quality and safety of conventional food products. As a
consequence, sustainable food products have gained attention from consumers, whose
demand for and attitudes toward alternative labeling strategies, as GAP, IPPM or
organic, have consistently increased in developed countries. Some results related with
vegetables and, more specifically, with potato consumption patterns, are reported in
Cheng et al. (2001), Matsuda (2005), Yue et al. (2007), and Song et al. (2010).
3.3 Random Coefficients Discrete Choice Model
The theoretical framework chosen to analyze the introduction of the GAP-labeled
FFP is the RCDCM of demand. Since McFadden’s logistic demand model (McFad-
den, 1973), the discrete choice literature has provided solutions to deal with some
obstacles faced in the study of differentiated-product markets, in particular when es-
timating demand functions. On the one hand, it is the computational complexity of
estimating a large number of parameters. On the other hand, there is a difficulty as-
sociated with the possibility of modeling the heterogeneity in consumers’ tastes with
which to get more realistic estimations of substitution patterns and welfare changes
in counterfactual scenarios. The RCDCM overcomes such challenges because it al-
lows to identify individual coefficients of the attributes in the utility function. In the
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following subsections we outline the main elements of the RCDCM approach.
3.3.1 Demand
Suppose t = 1, ..., T markets (as defined below) are observed, each with i = 1, ..., I
consumers. The conditional indirect utility of consumer i from product j (j =
1, ..., J) at market t is
uijt = xjβ
∗
i − α∗i pjt + ξj + ∆ξjt + εijt (3.1)
where xj is a K-dimensional (row) vector of observable product characteristics,
pjt is the price of product j in market t, ξj is the mean valuation of the unobserved
product characteristics, ∆ξjt is a market-specific deviation from this mean, and εijt
is a mean-zero stochastic term distributed i.i.d. with Type I extreme-value distri-
bution. Finally, (α∗i , β
∗
i ) are K + 1 individual-specific coefficients, defined following









+ ΠDi + Σνi, νi ∼ N(0, IK+1) (3.2)
where (α, β) are the mean parameters of the utility function, Di is a d× 1 vector
of observed demographic variables, νi is a vector of normal random shocks in tastes,
1
Π is a (K + 1)× d matrix of coefficients that measure how the taste coefficients vary
with demographics, and Σ is a scaling matrix.
The consumers may decide not to purchase any of the products (outside option).
Without this allowance a homogeneous price increase of all products does not change
quantities purchased. The indirect utility from this outside good is
ui0t = ξ0 + π0Di + σ0νi0 + εi0t
The mean utility of the outside good, ξ0, is not identified, so it is normalized to
1The vector νi represents the unobserved individual characteristics (i.e., not available in the
demographic dataset) that affect preferences.
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zero.
Let θ = (θ1, θ2) be a vector containing all parameters of the model.
2 Combining
equations 3.1 and 3.2
uijt = δjt(xj, pjt, ξj,∆ξjt; θ1) + µijt(xj, pjt, νi, Di; θ2) + εijt
δjt = xjβ − αpjt + ξj + ∆ξjt; µijt = [pjt, xj]′ × (ΠDi + Σνi)
(3.3)
where δjt represents the mean utility, which is common to all consumers, and
µijt + εijt is a mean-zero heteroskedastic deviation from that mean that captures the
effects of the random coefficients.
It is assumed that consumers purchase one unit of the good that gives the highest
utility.3 This implicitly defines the set of individual-specific variables that lead to
the choice of good j:
Ajt(x, p.t, δ.t;θ2) = {(Di, νi, εit) | uijt ≥ uilt ∀l = 0, 1, ..., J}
Assuming ties occur with zero probability, the market share of the jth product as
a function of the mean utility levels of all the J + 1 goods, given the parameters, is
sjt(x, p.t, δ.t;θ2) =
∫
Ajt




where P ∗(·) denotes population distribution functions. The second equality is a
consequence of an assumption of independence of D, ν, and ε. These market share
equations do not have an analytic closed form, and therefore the integral given in
equation 3.4 has to be computed numerically.
Since the main data source includes aggregate sales data, heterogeneity can be
modeled either by assuming a parametric distribution of P ∗(·) (Berry, 1994; Berry
et al., 1995) or as a function of the empirical non-parametric distribution of demo-
graphics (Nevo, 2001). We implement the second option in this paper, which allows
us to assess the joint distribution of the demographic variables in D.
2The reason for distinguishing between linear and nonlinear parameters has to do with how
they enter the model and the estimator, as will be shown below.
3This is a reasonable assumption since most people consume only one kind of FFP at a time.
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3.3.2 Supply
Suppose there are F firms, each of which produces some subset Ff of the j = 1, ..., J




(pj −mcj)Msj(p)− Cf (3.5)
where sj(p) is the market share of product j, which is a function of the prices
of all products, M is the size of the market,4 mcj is the constant marginal cost of
production, and Cf is the fixed cost of production. Assuming the existence of a
pure-strategy Bertrand-Nash equilibrium in prices, and that the prices that support









In vector notation, the first-order conditions become
s(p) + (Ω.×∆)(p−mc) = 0 (3.7)
where Ω is the ownership matrix, whose element Ωjr equals one if j and r are
produced by the same firm, and zero otherwise. ∆ is the derivative matrix, where
∆jr = ∂sr(p)/∂pj, which is obtained when estimating the demand model. This
implies a system of equations to compute the marginal costs, which are not observed:
mc = p+ (Ω.×∆)−1s(p) (3.8)
4The market size defined in this model includes the share of the outside good, which allows
keeping the market size fixed while still allowing the total quantity of products sold to increase.




The measure we use to evaluate the changes in consumer welfare as a result of the
introduction of the new product is the compensating variation. This measure does
not have an analytical solution for the RCDCM, because α∗i in equation 3.1 is a
function of income. The compensating variation of individual i, CVi, has to be
computed iteratively, and is equal to −∆yi, where ∆yi solves
ui(yi, p) = u
∗
i (yi + ∆yi, p
∗) (3.9)
where yi is the income of individual i and p is the vector of prices in the initial
situation. The left-hand side of equation 3.9 is the utility of individual i before the
introduction of the new product. The utility function ui(·) is estimated using sales
data and demographic information, as explained below. The difference between ui(·)
and u∗i (·) on the right-hand side is that the last one includes the coefficient of the new
attribute, i.e., the effect of the GAP label on utility, whose calculation is explained in
Subsection 3.4.4. Lastly, p∗ is the vector of prices that would result in the simulated
equilibrium with GAP-labeled products.
Given the individual compensating variation CVi, the mean compensating varia-








where N is the total number of consumers.
Two additional assumptions have to be made when computing these changes in
consumer surplus. First, the introduction of the new product does not affect con-
sumer valuation of existing attributes, i.e., the coefficients of the characteristics in
the utility function remain constant, and so does the unobserved component ξjt.
Second, there are no changes in the utility from the outside good.
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3.4 Data, estimation, and identifying assumptions
3.4.1 Data
The data required to estimate the RCDCM consist of the following variables: market
shares and prices in each market (as defined below), product attributes, and socioe-
conomic characteristics of individuals. Since we do not possess information about
individual purchases, we match scanner data with a demographic database, which
provides the distribution of demographic variables across population in each market,
in order to identify the variable part of the coefficients.
The scanner database was provided by a traditional supermarket chain in Mar del
Plata, Supermercados Toledo S. A., and consists of the value of monthly sales and the
quantity sold for each product and each of the 24 branches of the supermarket, from
July 2005 to December 2009. The city of Mar del Plata is located on the Atlantic
Ocean cost, 400 kilometers (249 miles) south of Buenos Aires City, the capital city
of Argentina. It is one of the major fishing ports, an important industrial area,
and the biggest seaside beach resort in the country. With a population of roughly
600,000, Mar del Plata is the second largest city of Buenos Aires Province and the
seventh largest Argentinean city, and is the main urban center of the major potato
production area of the country, which is located in the southeast Province of Buenos
Aires. Figure 3.1 shows the geographical distribution of the supermarket branches,
confirming their widespread allocation in the city.
The sales data cover 18 FFP products supplied by three firms (McCain, Alimentos
Modernos, and Granja del Sol) through four brands (McCain, FarmFrites, Granja
del Sol, and RapiPap), and are classified in six segments or varieties (bastón, golden
longs, noisette, rondelles, smiles, and croquettes) and offered in several container
sizes. Nutritional information about calories, saturated fat, fiber, and sodium was
collected by visual inspection of the products’ nutrition facts labels. Unit value per
serving was calculated as a proxy for price, by dividing the value of sales by the
quantity of servings sold, which was computed as the package size divided by the
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Figure 3.1: Location of Supermercados Toledo branches in Mar del Plata, Argentina
Source. Google Maps 2011 at www.supertoledo.com.
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serving size5 and multiplied by the quantity of units sold.
Information on the distribution of demographics was obtained by sampling indi-
viduals from the Encuesta Permanente de Hogares (EPH), which is carried out by
the Instituto Nacional de Estad́ısticas y Censos (INDEC) in several cities of the
country; in this paper we use the information about households in Mar del Plata.
The socioeconomic variables of interest are per capita income and average age of
the household members, which is related with both household size and presence of
children.
In this paper, a market is defined as a branch-month combination. Since the EPH
does not provide the geographical location of surveyed households, it is not possible
to characterize the customers of a particular branch by drawing demographic infor-
mation of its nearby households. We matched the sales and demographic datasets by
defining the income level of the branches’ neighborhoods, using an auxiliary dataset.
We first calculated per capita average income of each Mar del Plata census tract
using data from a household survey.6 Then, the potential customers of each super-
market branch were identified according to the population of the census tract in
which the branch is located. Finally, the branches were classified by the income level
of their potential buyers (high, upper-middle, middle, lower-middle, and low).7 The
demographic characterization of each market was accomplished by randomly drawing
simulated individuals from the corresponding period and quintile of the EPH.
Lastly, to calculate the market shares it is necessary to assess the market size, i.e.,
the total potential demand for FFP of the supermarket chain. This was obtained as
the 35%8 of the total potential demand, which in turn was calculated by imputing the
FFP consumption frequency of “real consumers”9 to the market’s population. This
5According to the Argentine Food Code, the size of a serving of FFP is 85 grams (2.99 oz).
6The description of this survey is provided in Subsection 3.4.4.
7These income categories were defined according to the average quintile income of the households
surveyed by the EPH in the second quarter of 2009, period in which the potato consumption survey
was carried out.
8This is Supermercados Toledo’s share of total supermarket sales in Mar del Plata, according
to the opinion of key actors in the supermarket industry.
9This refers to the FFP consumption frequency of those polled in the potato consumption survey
who declared they consume FFP.
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was done for each of the branches regarding their potential customers. The market
share of each product in each market was determined by dividing the quantity of
servings sold by the market size.
Table 3.1 presents the characteristics of the FFP products that appear at least
once in our scanner database. We assign them an identification number (ID) which
we will refer to in the results section. Bastón is the most popular variety followed by
noisette, despite its relatively high price. On the other hand, croquettes and rondelles
are the varieties with the least market shares. It can be seen that Toledo customers
can take advantage of economies of scale in these products, since price per serving
decrease as container size increases, at equal value of the other characteristics.
Table 3.1: Product characteristics, market shares, and prices.
ID Brand Variety Cont Calories Fat Fiber Sodium Avg Avg
size (g) (kcal) (g) (g) (mg) price mkt sh
1110 McCain Bastón 720 106 0.3 4 66 0.71 0.0026
1111 McCain Bastón 720 106 0.3 4 66 0.4 0.0008
1120 McCain Bastón 1000 106 0.3 4 66 0.48 0.0021
1130 McCain Bastón 1500 106 0.3 4 66 0.42 0.0007
1210 McCain Golden Longs 1000 127 0.4 0.6 54 0.44 0.0014
1310 McCain Noisette 500 228 0.4 1.7 336 1.45 0.0012
1320 McCain Noisette 1000 228 0.4 1.7 336 0.99 0.0013
1410 McCain Rondelles 1000 127 0.4 0.6 54 0.53 0.0005
1510 McCain Smiles 600 177 0.6 1.9 383 1.04 0.0008
2110 Farm Frites Bastón 400 91 0.1 1.7 15 1.06 0.0009
2120 Farm Frites Bastón 700 91 0.1 1.7 15 0.65 0.0021
2130 Farm Frites Bastón 1000 91 0.1 1.7 15 0.61 0.0019
2310 Farm Frites Noisette 450 121 2 3 374 1.2 0.0008
2320 Farm Frites Noisette 1000 121 2 3 374 1.04 0.0013
3110 Granja del Sol Bastón 500 99 0.5 2.8 34 0.51 0.0021
3120 Granja del Sol Bastón 800 99 0.5 2.8 34 0.5 0.0014
3610 Granja del Sol Croquettes 300 174 0.9 2.4 444 1.93 0.0005
4110 RapiPap Bastón 700 99 1.1 2.8 20 0.66 0.0030
Note. 1 g = 0.0353 oz. Nutritional information refers to a serving of the product. Prices are expressed in Argentine
Pesos ($1 = U$S 3.19, on average, during the period of analysis). Products 1110 and 1111 differ in package design.
The average market size of the outside good is 0.98714.
Table 3.2 reports FFP average prices by variety and income level. For all varieties,
prices increase with income; golden longs, rondelles and bastón are the least expensive
products in all income levels, and croquettes are the most expensive. The last column
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shows the percentage difference between average prices in high- and low-income-
level branches. Consumers of high income-level face higher prices than consumers
of low income-level for any product variety, which suggests the presence of a price
discrimination strategy implemented by sellers. Golden longs and smiles are the
varieties in which the highest surcharges are imposed, while bastón and noisette
present the lowest surcharges.
Table 3.2: FFP average prices by variety and income level.
Variety \Income High Upper Middle Lower Low High/low
-middle -middle surcharge
Bastón 0.613 0.611 0.604 0.612 0.607 0.99%
Noisette 1.125 1.119 1.092 1.124 1.103 1.99%
Golden Longs 0.446 0.441 0.439 0.423 0.421 5.94%
Rondelles 0.539 0.534 0.529 0.519 0.518 4.05%
Smiles 1.069 1.059 1.033 1.028 1.021 4.70%
Croquettes 1.956 1.964 1.907 1.921 1.885 3.77%
Note. Prices are expressed in Argentine Pesos.
Lastly, Table 3.3 shows average prices by brand and income level. Such as in the
previous table, prices increase with income regardless the brand. Granja del Sol offers
the most expensive products on average, while RapiPap FFP is the least expensive
option.
Table 3.3: FFP average prices by brand and income level.
Variety \Income High Upper Middle Lower Low High/low
-middle -middle surcharge
McCain 0.752 0.740 0.728 0.728 0.722 4.16%
FarmFrites 0.875 0.885 0.870 0.895 0.875 0.00%
Granja del Sol 1.235 1.240 1.210 1.210 1.195 3.35%
RapiPap 0.66 0.660 0.650 0.670 0.660 0.00%
Note. Prices are expressed in Argentine Pesos.
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3.4.2 Estimation
The key point of the estimation is to exploit a population moment condition that is
a product of instrumental variables and a structural error term to form a nonlinear
GMM estimator. The main technical difficulties to deal with are related to the
computation of the integral in equation 3.4, and to matching theoretical to observed
market shares. Formally, let Z = [z1, ..., zM ] be a set of instruments such that
E[Z ′ω(θ∗)] = 0, where ω, a function of the model parameters, is an error term
defined below and θ∗ denotes the true value of the parameters. The GMM estimator
is
θ̂ = arg min
θ
ω(θ)′ZA−1Z ′ω(θ) (3.11)
where A is a consistent estimate of E[Z ′ωω′Z]. Because of the inclusion of product-
specific dummy variables as product characteristics (as explained below), the error
term is defined as the market specific deviation from the mean valuation of the
unobserved product characteristics, ∆ξjt.
10 This error term is computed by solving
for the mean utility levels, δ.t, that solve the implicit system of equations
s.t(x, p.t, δ.t, θ2) = S.t (3.12)
where s.t(·) is the market share function defined by equation 3.4 and S.t are the
observed market shares. This inversion is done numerically. Once this inversion
has been done, the error term is defined as ωjt = δjt(x, p.t, S.t; θ2) − (xjβ − αpjt).
The reason for distinguishing between θ1 and θ2 becomes clear now: θ1 enters this
error term, and therefore the objective function, in a linear fashion, while θ2 enters
nonlinearly.11
10A straightforward approach to the estimation of this model is to define the error term as the
difference between the observed and predicted market shares. In this work, we define a structural
error term following the estimation method proposed by Berry (1994), which allows one to deal
with correlation between the error term and prices. The advantage of working with a structural
error is that the link to economic theory is tighter, allowing us to think of economic theories that
would justify various instrumental variables (Nevo, 2000).
11The estimation algorithm is explained in detail in Nevo (2000).
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3.4.3 Instruments and product-specific dummy variables
As pointed out, once product dummy variables are included in the regression, the
error term is the unobserved (to the researcher) income-month specific deviation
from the overall mean valuation of the product. Since we assume that players in the
industry observe and account for this deviation (i.e., firms take it into account when
setting prices, and it affects consumers’ utility and WTP), it will be correlated with
prices, and therefore least-squares estimate of price sensitivity, α, will be biased and
inconsistent.
Our identifying strategy follows that of Nevo (2001), which in turn uses an ap-
proach similar to that used by Hausman (1994). Exploiting the panel structure of the
data, the identifying assumption is that, controlling for product-specific means and
demographics, market-level-specific valuations are independent across markets (but
are allowed to be correlated within market). Given this assumption, the prices of
the product in other branches and months (and in other cities) are valid IV’s. Since
prices are a function of marginal costs, and assuming marginal costs have a com-
mon component to all branches and months, prices of product j in two markets will
be correlated (relevance condition). On the other hand, due to the independence
assumption they will be uncorrelated with the market-specific valuation of other
branches and months (exclusion condition). According to all this, we use prices in
other branches and months as instruments. Additionally, the data source provides
sales data of branches located in other cities (Azul, Balcarce, Miramar, Necochea,
Olavarŕıa, and Tandil), so we use the monthly average price of the product in those
branches as IVs too.
Regarding the inclusion of product-specific dummy variables as product charac-
teristics, one reason to introduce them is that they improve the fit of the model since
we cannot be sure that the observed characteristics capture the entire set of factors
that determine utility. But a major motivation is to prevent the mean valuation of
the unobserved product characteristics, ξj, from being part of the error term. These
dummies capture all attributes that do not vary by market, and therefore the corre-
lation between prices and the unobserved quality is fully accounted for and does not
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require an instrument. Because observable characteristics (except price) do not vary
by market either, the taste parameters have to be retrieved by using a minimum dis-
tance procedure (as in Chamberlain (1982)). Let d denote the J×1 vector of product
dummy coefficients, X be the J ×K (K < J) matrix of product characteristics, and
ξ be the J × 1 vector of unobserved product qualities. Then from equation 3.1
d = Xβ + ξ
If we assume that E(ξ|X) = 0,12 the estimates of β and ξ are
β̂ = (X ′V −1d X)
−1X ′V −1d d̂, ξ̂ = d̂−Xβ̂
where d̂ is the vector of coefficients estimated from the procedure described in
Subsection 3.4.2, and Vd is the variance-covariance matrix of these estimates.
Finally, time dummy variables are included in the estimation in order to identify
the pure effect of product characteristics on consumers utility once the time effect
is controlled for. This is especially relevant for price parameter estimates because
significant inflation rates were verified over the analyzed period.
3.4.4 Counterfactual simulation: the nitty-gritty
As pointed out, previous work that analyzes the effect of new goods define new
products as a different combination of already existing characteristics, that is, those
included in the demand estimation. In general, their approach consists of estimating
the utility function using data containing sales of the product or attribute of interest,
and then evaluating the changes in welfare caused by the withdrawal of the product
from the market. Instead, here we analyze the introduction of a product that is
new because it possesses an attribute that is not yet available in the market (the
GAP label), and therefore its influence on utility cannot be recovered with sales
12This is the assumption required to justify the use of observed characteristics as IV’s. We explain
elsewhere (González and Lacaze, 2012) that this strategy could yield inconsistent estimators. Here
this assumption is used only to recover the taste parameters and does not impact the estimates of
price sensitivity.
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data. However, it is necessary to identify the coefficient of the attribute in the utility
function in order to assess changes in consumer welfare (see Subsection 3.3.3), so this
coefficient was obtained by performing additional calculations, which are explained
in what follows.
More concretely, the typical procedure to evaluate the effect of the introduction of
a new product would be to, first, recover the new prices following equation 3.7
p∗ = m̂c− (Ω∗.× ∆̂∗)−1ŝ(x∗, p∗)
and use them to simulate the new market shares and welfare changes with the
demand and utility functions. However, this is not feasible to achieve with only
market data if the new product has a novel attribute, because the demand estimation
would provide a market share function ŝj = s(x, p,D; α̂, β̂, Π̂, Σ̂) whereas we would
need ŝ∗j = s(x, p,D; α̂, β̂, γ̂, Π̂, Σ̂). Here γ comes from the utility function in the
hypothetical situation introduced in Subsection 3.3.3, u∗i , defined as
u∗ijt = xjβ
∗
i − α∗i pjt + γ∗iGAPj + ξj + ∆ξjt + εijt
where GAPj is a dummy variable indicating if product j is labeled as produced
following GAP protocols.
To obtain γ∗i , note that, given the functional form of the utility function, the price
and GAP coefficients can be expressed as the derivatives of utility with respect to
these attributes, i.e., α∗i = −∂uijt/∂pjt and γ∗i = −∂uijt/∂GAPj. In this case, the
WTP for the GAP attribute, measured as the price premium that consumers would



















which is a well-know result in the literature (Gil et al., 2000; Loureiro and Um-
berger, 2001). Therefore, if we knew the stated WTP of consumers for the GAP
attribute, we could calculate the GAP coefficient γ∗i using equation 3.13
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WTP ∗i = −
γ∗i
α∗i
⇒ γ∗i = −α∗i ×WTP ∗i (3.14)
since we have the individual price coefficients from the RCDCM estimated with
sales data.
A measure of the WTP for a GAP-labeled FFP was assessed by employing an
auxiliary dataset. It is a survey of fresh potato consumption in which consumers were
asked for their WTP for IPPM potatoes using the contingent valuation method.13
As mentioned above, since the IPPM system overcomes one of the major challenges
of GAP, which is minimizing the use of chemical substances in agriculture, both
production schemes are closely related because they both can be interpreted as the
implementation of sustainable agricultural practices for food production. Therefore,
it would be expected that consumers would be willing to pay a very similar amount
for GAP than for IPPM fresh potatoes. Assuming, then, that WTP for IPPM is
an accurate measure of WTP for GAP fresh potatoes, we approximated how much
would surveyed consumers be willing to pay for GAP-labeled FFP. We distinguished
those consumers elicited in the survey who reported consuming FFP from those who
reported not consuming. Two scenarios were considered. In the first scenario (Sce1),
we assumed that consumers who purchase FFP were willing to pay for a GAP-labeled
FFP the same price premium (in percentage terms) as for GAP fresh potatoes. On
the other hand, the WTP of those who do not purchase FFP would be the half of
their WTP for GAP fresh potato. In the second scenario (Sce2), it was assumed
that consumers who purchase FFP were willing to pay for a GAP-labeled FFP half
of their WTP for GAP fresh potatoes, while those who do not purchase FFP were
not willing to pay an extra price premium for a GAP FFP. Therefore, the first is the
more optimistic scenario and the second is the pessimistic one.
In order to generate γ∗i for each simulated individual in the demand estimation,
we modeled the WTP for GAP-labeled FFP as a function of the demographic char-
acteristics of the surveyed consumers:
13This survey was conducted in Mar del Plata in June 2009 by the Grupo de Economı́a Agraria of
the Facultad de Ciencias Económicas y Sociales, Universidad Nacional de Mar del Plata (Argentina)
to 500 households in Mar del Plata (Rodŕıguez et al., 2010).
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WTP ∗i = WTP + φ1y + φ2age (3.15)
where WTP is the average WTP, and φ1 and φ2 were estimated with OLS.
14
Replacing (15) in (14) the individual GAP coefficient γ∗i is obtained, and the new
price can now be recovered using
p∗ = m̂c− (Ω∗.× ∆̂∗)−1ŝ∗(x∗, p∗). (3.16)
Note that the matrix of derivatives ∆ changes along with s(·). m̂c in equation 3.16
is the marginal cost computed in the demand estimation using equation 3.8, and it
is assumed to remain unchanged in the counterfactual scenario. This assumption
is reasonable here since, according to information provided by key actors of the
market, potato processing companies do not pay a higher price to farmers for GAP
fresh potatoes than for conventional ones, and then their production costs remain
constant. We discuss some welfare implications of this market feature below.
The proposed methodological strategy to assess the effect of introducing the new
attribute allows us to take advantage of the main strengths that each preferences
elicitation approach possesses. On the one hand, the demand estimation by us-
ing market data (revealed-preferences approach) produces an accurate measure of
price sensitivity since they reflect purchasing choices really constrained by household
budget restrictions. On the other hand, the contingent valuation method (stated-
preferences approach) allows exploring consumers’ assessment for attributes that are
not available in the market.
We carry out the simulation using as a benchmark the market conditions in De-
cember 2009. We choose the last month of the sales data for the results to be the
most up-to-date as possible, and also because it is close to the date on which the aux-
iliary survey was held. In our hypothetical scenario, we postulate that all products
of McCain brand now posses a label identifying them as produced under GAP.
14This way of modeling the WTP is reasonable since both income and age are expressed as devi-
ations to the mean, both in the auxiliary dataset from which φ1 and φ2 were estimated, and in the
demographic database used to perform the RCDCM estimation and the counterfactual simulation.
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3.5 Results
3.5.1 Utility function coefficients
We estimate a RCDCM of demand, whose results are shown in Table 3.4. The
constant term, content, brand, and bastón and noisette varieties enter the model
linearly; price, nutritional variables, and smiles have random coefficients. While
nutritional parameters are assumed to be affected by income, the coefficient of smiles
variety is interacted with age. As for price, its coefficient is supposed to depend on
both consumer income and age.
The estimates of the mean parameters of the utility function indicate that, on
average, consumers’ utility increases as the FFP content of fiber and calories increase,
and as the content of fat decreases. McCain products were revealed as the least valued
FFP. The most popular varieties, bastón and noisette, are valued very differently by
the average consumer if compared with the base group (golden longs, rondelles, and
croquettes): the valuation of bastón is negative, and the valuation of noisette is
positive. The sign of the mean price coefficient is negative as expected. Finally,
content, sodium, and smiles coefficient are statistically insignificant (though of the
expected sign).
Estimates of heterogeneity around these means are presented in the next few
columns. The results suggest that the marginal valuation of the nutritional at-
tributes is accentuated by increasing income; in other words, individuals are more
sensitive to the negative effect of fat and sodium as they are wealthier, and are also
more sensitive to the positive effect of fiber. These results are in line with the liter-
ature, according to which high income individuals are more concerned about health
and nutrition than low income individuals. Coefficients on the interaction of price
with demographics are statistically significant, and indicate that younger and lower-
income consumers tend to be more price-sensitive. A more elastic demand of younger
households might be associated with a low participation of FFP in their diet. Given
that household average age decreases with the presence of children, and according to
the literature, it could be driven by parents’ concerns about their children’s health,
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Constant -6.023 - - -
(2.601)
Price -7.589 0.089 1.489 3.056
(2.904) (0.020) (0.689) (2.555)
Content -0.753 - - -
(0.552)
McCain -5.266 - - -
(2.332)
Calories 6.211 0.012 - 1.073
(1.282) (0.009) (0.256)
Fat -2.003 -0.195 - -1.956
(0.365) (0.087) (1.287)
Fiber 5.008 0.254 - 0.321
(2.289) (0.117) (0.009)
Sodium -3.665 -0.011 - -2.007
(1.998) (0.002) (0.775)
Bastón -14.895 - - -
(7.523)
Noisettes 1.023 - - -
(0.306)
Smiles 0.589 - 0.147 2.366
(2.582) (0.080) (0.982)
R2 0.712
% αi > 0 0.053
Note. Standard errors are given in parentheses. The estimation includes time dummy variables. The units of
measurement of content, nutritional characteristics, and demographic variables were adjusted to scale these variables
similarly.
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if FFP are perceived as an unhealthy food. This argument is reinforced by the sta-
tistical insignificance of the mean parameter of smiles and its interaction with age,
since smiles is a kid-oriented variety.
Finally, the effect of random shocks to tastes on price and fat coefficients is not
significant, suggesting that the heterogeneity in the coefficients is mostly explained
by the included demographics. On the contrary, calories, fiber, sodium, and smiles
present statistically significant σ coefficients, implying that part of the parameter
variability (all of it in the cases of calories and smiles) is captured by unobserved in-
dividual characteristics. This is especially interesting for sodium and smiles, since the
average effect of these variables on utility is not statistically different from zero, but
even so our results indicate there is heterogeneity in preferences for these attributes,
driven by unobserved (smiles) or by both observed and unobserved (sodium) demo-
graphic characteristics.
3.5.2 Counterfactual introduction of a new product: a GAP-labeled
FFP
In this section, the simulation results of the introduction of GAP-labeled products
in the FFP industry are presented. To perform this counterfactual exercise, we use
the demand estimation, the computed GAP coefficient, and the measure of welfare
detailed in Subsection 3.3.3. In Table 3.5 we present the effects on average prices
and market shares for each of the scenarios defined in Subsection 3.4.4. With the
addition of a GAP label, McCain products increase the price, whereas other brands
slightly decrease prices, especially for product varieties offered by McCain in this
period. There is a decrease in the market share of the outside good, which indicates
that consumers that were not participating in this market before would buy FFP
now. This is a consequence of an increase in the market share of McCain products,
but also of products from other brands that captured consumers through a decrease
in prices. The results are similar in both scenarios, although naturally milder in the
pessimistic one.
To evaluate the relevance of the introduction of the new product, we assess its
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Table 3.5: Changes in prices and market shares after the hypothetical introduction
of GAP-labeled FFPs.
Brand Segment Pkg size
Initial situation Sce1 Sce2
price mkt share price mkt share price mkt share
McCain Bastón 720 0.859 0.00052 0.876 0.00053 0.867 0.00053
McCain Noisette 500 1.564 0.00450 1.642 0.00464 1.610 0.00459
McCain Noisette 1000 1.606 0.00340 1.670 0.00347 1.654 0.00343
McCain Smiles 600 1.301 0.00201 1.392 0.00213 1.366 0.00209
Farm Frites Bastón 400 1.236 0.00198 1.211 0.00196 1.224 0.00198
Farm Frites Bastón 700 0.942 0.00066 0.932 0.00064 0.941 0.00065
Farm Frites Bastón 1000 0.826 0.00129 0.810 0.00130 0.818 0.00130
Farm Frites Noisette 450 1.436 0.00133 1.364 0.00130 1.393 0.00132
Farm Frites Noisette 1000 1.170 0.00127 1.123 0.00130 1.134 0.00128
Granja del Sol Croquettes 300 2.737 0.00031 2.735 0.00031 2.737 0.00031
RapiPap Bastón 700 0.924 0.00072 0.878 0.00071 0.887 0.00072
Outside good 0.98201 0.98171 0.98181
Note. Prices are expressed in Argentine Pesos.
influence on consumer welfare. First, we computed the compensating variation CVi
for each sampled individual in the analyzed market. Then we averaged the compen-
sating variation across the sample and multiplied by the number of consumers to get
total change in consumer surplus (equation 3.10). Total number of consumers was
assumed to be 600,000 (the population of Mar del Plata). In Sce1, the introduction
of the GAP-labeled FFP would cause an increase in the welfare of the Mar del Plata
consumers of AR$17,810 a month. In Sce2, the monthly improvement in consumer
surplus would only rise to AR$472. Note that the outside good possesses a very
high market share in this industry, since every inside good has a little market share
because of the still incipient importance of these products in consumers’ regular diet.
This relates to our result that most simulated individuals keep choosing the outside
good after the addition of the new products. Therefore, few consumers must be
income-compensated, either because they change their choice and start consuming
GAP-labeled FFPs, or because they change from the outside good to the new prod-
uct. This explains the low impact of the change in available FFP on consumers’
welfare.
In order to analyze the heterogeneous impact of the counterfactual simulation
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on consumers’ welfare, Figure 3.2 shows the relationship between the individual
compensating variation and demographic characteristics in Sce1. In general, the
older the individual, the greater the individual welfare change due to the hypothetical
introduction of the GAP-labeled product. The relationship between CVi and income
seems to be direct too, but is less conclusive.












































-4 -2 0 2 4
age
(b) CVi and average household age.
Note. Compensating variations are expressed in Argentine Pesos.
As it is mentioned above, potato processing companies do not pay farmers higher
prices for GAP-obtained potatoes than they pay for conventionally grown ones. How-
ever, the implementation of GAP protocols raises production costs, and therefore
farmers could start claiming processing companies to pay higher prices for GAP
fresh potatoes. To evaluate the effects of this event, we calculate the maximum
increase in the marginal cost mcj that McCain would be able to afford if farmers
charged higher prices. We found that, keeping its profit constant, McCain could
pay up to 19% more in Sce1, and up to 10% more in Sce2, on average. This result
emphasizes the importance of both agronomic aspects and farmers interests, as well
as consumers’ preferences, for the success of any strategy that seeks to introduce a
sustainable food product in the market.
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3.6 Conclusions
This paper makes a contribution to the empirical literature of RCDCM of demand,
which has been scarcely applied in Argentina, mainly regarding food industries. Be-
sides, it contributes to the analysis of a food market which is rapidly growing in
developing countries and, as a consequence, is starting to play a more relevant role
in consumers’ diet. The main motivation of this paper stems from the fact that the
Argentinean processed potato industry is growingly demanding potato producers to
implement GAP protocols. By using declared consumers’ WTP for IPPM fresh pota-
toes, the article makes hypothetical assessments of a new attribute that FFP would
possess, i.e., the quality certification that GAP label would assure. Finally, we argue
for and predict the results of a greater consumer surplus extraction, which should
definitively require an appropriate signaling of the GAP attribute. The results of our
work emphasize that technological adoption, agri-industry contracts, and communi-
cation issues along the supply chain are of extremely importance behind a successful
introduction of a credence-attribute product in the food market.
To produce such welfare evaluations, we start by studying the heterogeneity in
consumer preferences for FFP attributes. The RCDCM provides to add consumer
heterogeneity into the utility function. The degree of substitutability among the
available products is therefore assessed in a more realistic way than other discrete
choice models do. Results from RCDCM estimations indicate that the attributes
of the FFP actually affect consumers’ utility and that this effect is conditioned by
their demographic characteristics. They also suggest that high income individuals
are more concerned about health and nutrition than low income individuals, and
that younger and lower-income consumers tend to be more price-sensitive.
The applied RCDCM of demand allows us to evaluate the introduction of a new
product with an attribute not supplied in the market before, namely the GAP label.
Since the influence of this attribute on the utility function cannot be recovered with
sales data, we need to use stated-willingness to pay from an auxiliary dataset to
compute it. The proposed methodological strategy allows us to take advantage of
the main strengths that revealed- and stated-preferences approaches possess. On the
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one hand, by using market data the demand model retrieves an accurate measure
of price sensitivity. On the other hand, the contingent valuation method allows
exploring consumers’ assessment for attributes that are not available in the market.
Two scenarios were formulated in order to assess the welfare changes. With the new
product, consumers’ welfare improves, mainly in the more optimistic scenario.
Because of the still minor importance of these products in consumers’ regular
diet, the outside good reaches a high market share and therefore most consumers
continue choosing it after the new product addition. The compensating variation
for those who should be offset increases with age but the correlation with income
seems to be not conclusive. Finally, the maximum cost increase that the processing
firm could afford without dropping its profit was also calculated. This would be
interpreted as the upper bound for the additional price that farmers could claim
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(b) Cycling station.
Note. Dashed lines delimit the dates in τ+ and τ− for the station-level price dynamic examples of Figure 1.3.
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Table A.1: Spatial predictors for cycling behavior.
All w/neighbors
Location characteristics
Income (log) 0.004 -0.001
(0.005) (0.005)
Population density -0.001∗∗∗ -0.001∗∗
(0.000) (0.000)
No. of neighboring stations 0.013∗∗∗ 0.002
(0.002) (0.002)
No. of neighbors (sq) -0.001∗∗∗ -0.000
(0.000) (0.000)
Neighbors’ behavior
Avg. neighbors’ ind. 0.248∗∗∗
(0.009)
Closest neighbor’s ind. 0.136∗∗∗
(0.007)
Dist. closest neigh. (100m) 0.004∗∗∗
(0.001)




Station char. Yes Yes
City-brand FE Yes Yes
Note. Dependent variable: cycling indicator (linear probability model); the observation level is a gas station. Results
in the first column include all the stations in our sample; second column includes gas stations with at least one
neighboring station. Neighbors are defined as gas stations within a 1-mile radius. Standard errors in parenthesis. ∗
p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Table A.2: Spatial predictors for cycling behavior. Restricted sample.
All w/neighbors
Location characteristics
Income (log) 0.010∗∗ 0.004
(0.005) (0.005)
Population density -0.001∗∗ -0.000∗
(0.000) (0.000)
No. of neighboring stations 0.013∗∗∗ 0.003
(0.002) (0.002)
No. of neighbors (sq) -0.001∗∗∗ -0.000
(0.000) (0.000)
Neighbors’ behavior
Avg. neighbors’ ind. 0.234∗∗∗
(0.009)
Closest neighbor’s ind. 0.124∗∗∗
(0.008)
Dist. closest neigh. (100m) 0.004∗∗∗
(0.001)




Station char. Yes Yes
City-brand FE Yes Yes
Note. Dependent variable: cycling indicator (linear probability model); the observation level is a gas station. Results
in the first column include all the stations in our restricted sample; second column includes (restricted sample) gas
stations with at least one neighboring station. Neighbors are defined as gas stations within a 1-mile radius. Standard
errors in parenthesis. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Table A.3: Cycling behavior and station characteristics.









Loyalty discount -0.044∗∗∗ 0.024 -0.017 -0.004 -0.048∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.032) (0.021) (0.009) (0.005)
Cash discount -0.075∗∗∗ 0.001 0.007 -0.063∗∗∗ -0.087∗∗∗
(0.006) (0.023) (0.025) (0.016) (0.007)
Convenience store 0.049∗∗∗ 0.064∗∗∗ 0.052∗∗∗ 0.064∗∗∗ 0.045∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.019) (0.019) (0.009) (0.008)
Restaurant -0.029∗∗∗ -0.007 -0.009 -0.002 -0.048∗∗∗
(0.006) (0.026) (0.023) (0.012) (0.007)
Car wash -0.006 -0.030 0.019 0.002 -0.006
(0.005) (0.026) (0.022) (0.012) (0.006)
Service station -0.077∗∗∗ -0.072∗∗∗ -0.029 -0.158∗∗∗ -0.072∗∗∗
(0.007) (0.024) (0.029) (0.021) (0.008)
Truck stop 0.014 -0.027 -0.025 0.036∗ 0.005
(0.010) (0.038) (0.038) (0.019) (0.015)
R2 0.2370 0.2077 0.2564 0.2249 0.2533
Observations 58,497 4,354 4,172 12,489 37,482
Location char. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
City FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Note. Dependent variable: cycling indicator (linear probability model); the observation level is a gas station. Brand
sizes are defined as follows: small, up to 10 gas stations; med-small, more than 10 and less than 100; med-large,
more than 100 and less than 1000; big, more than 1000. Standard errors in parenthesis. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗
p < 0.01.
118
Table A.4: Cycling behavior and station characteristics. Restricted sample.









Loyalty discount -0.046∗∗∗ 0.007 -0.018 -0.004 -0.051∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.036) (0.022) (0.007) (0.006)
Cash discount -0.081∗∗∗ 0.045 0.036 -0.063∗∗∗ -0.102∗∗∗
(0.006) (0.028) (0.026) (0.015) (0.008)
Convenience store 0.029∗∗∗ 0.081∗∗∗ 0.035∗ 0.022∗∗∗ 0.034∗∗∗
(0.006) (0.022) (0.020) (0.008) (0.009)
Restaurant -0.029∗∗∗ -0.027 -0.014 -0.001 -0.047∗∗∗
(0.006) (0.029) (0.023) (0.011) (0.008)
Car wash -0.006 -0.036 0.008 0.001 -0.006
(0.005) (0.030) (0.022) (0.010) (0.007)
Service station -0.104∗∗∗ -0.092∗∗∗ -0.101∗∗∗ -0.161∗∗∗ -0.097∗∗∗
(0.008) (0.028) (0.029) (0.019) (0.010)
Truck stop 0.013 -0.010 -0.032 0.025 0.002
(0.011) (0.044) (0.038) (0.017) (0.016)
R2 0.2109 0.2315 0.2562 0.1948 0.2293
Observations 41,033 2,912 2,928 9,557 25,636
Location char. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
City FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Note. Dependent variable: cycling indicator (linear probability model); the observation level is a gas station. Brand
sizes are defined as follows: small, up to 10 gas stations; med-small, more than 10 and less than 100; med-large,
more than 100 and less than 1000; big, more than 1000. Standard errors in parenthesis. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗
p < 0.01.
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Figure A.2: A new cycling indicator. Restricted sample.
Note. Each Chicago gas station in our sample is represented by a point in these panels, according to their combination
of Cycling Ratio and average percent increase in price (price jump).
Table A.5: Cycling pricing strategy and price levels. Restricted sample.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Cycling indicator -11.986∗∗∗ -8.112∗∗∗ -6.157∗∗∗ -5.498∗∗∗
(0.025) (0.011) (0.010) (0.013)
Cycling intensity -0.282∗∗∗
(0.003)
Varying cycling ind. -0.728∗∗∗ -0.603∗∗∗
(0.009) (0.010)
Varying cycling int. -0.045∗∗∗
(0.001)
R2 0.2572 0.9423 0.9620 0.9621 0.9873 0.9873
Obs 7,184,024 7,184,024 7,184,024 7,184,024 5,248,969 5,248,969
Ȳ 253.352 253.352 253.352 253.352 252.961 252.961
Date FE Yes
Date-Zip FE No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
City-Brand FE No No Yes Yes
Station FE No No No No Yes Yes
Note. Dependent variable: price of regular gasoline, in cents; the observation level is a station-day combination.
Cycling indicator is the full-sample indicator of cycling behavior; cycle intensity is the full-sample Cycling Ratio.
Varying cycle indicator and intensity are the date-level versions of those two variables. Standard errors in parenthesis.










































































































Date-Zip FE Yes Yes
City-Brand FE Yes Yes
Note. Dependent variables: price of premium and midgrade gasoline, in cents; the observation level is a station-day
combination. Cycler is the full-sample indicator of cycling behavior. Standard errors in parenthesis. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗
p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Note. The coefficients plotted are the date-cycler fixed effect on price, controlling for zipcode and brand.
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(b) Restricted sample.
Table A.7: Cycling pricing strategy and price levels. Four-month rolling window.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Cycling indicator -11.446∗∗∗ -4.910∗∗∗ -3.429∗∗∗ -2.710∗∗∗
(0.019) (0.008) (0.007) (0.010)
Cycling intensity -0.315∗∗∗
(0.003)
Varying cycling ind. -0.170∗∗∗ -0.123∗∗∗
(0.006) (0.008)
Varying cycling int. -0.021∗∗∗
(0.002)
R2 0.2594 0.9359 0.9599 0.9600 0.9862 0.9862
Obs 10,113,008 10,113,008 10,113,008 10,113,008 7,129,088 7,129,088
Ȳ 256.080 256.080 256.080 256.080 254.100 254.100
Date FE Yes
Date-Zip FE No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
City-Brand FE No No Yes Yes
Station FE No No No No Yes Yes
Note. Dependent variable: price of regular gasoline, in cents; the observation level is a station-day combination.
Cycling indicator is the full-sample indicator of cycling behavior; cycle intensity is the full-sample Cycling Ratio.
Varying cycle indicator and intensity are the date-level versions of those two variables. Standard errors in parenthesis.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Table A.8: Cycling pricing strategy and price levels. Neighbor strategy controls.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Cycling indicator -8.209∗∗∗ -4.940∗∗∗ -3.418∗∗∗ -2.728∗∗∗
(0.022) (0.009) (0.008) (0.011)
Cycling intensity -0.302∗∗∗
(0.003)
Varying cycling ind. -0.594∗∗∗ -0.456∗∗∗
(0.006) (0.007)
Varying cycling int. -0.048∗∗∗
(0.001)
R2 0.2777 0.9370 0.9612 0.9613 0.9866 0.9866
Obs 8,863,627 8,863,627 8,863,627 8,863,627 6,217,738 6,217,738
Ȳ 256.366 256.366 256.366 256.366 254.370 254.370
Date FE Yes
Date-Zip FE No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
City-Brand FE No No Yes Yes
Station FE No No No No Yes Yes
Note. Dependent variable: price of regular gasoline, in cents; the observation level is a station-day combination.
Cycling indicator is the full-sample indicator of cycling behavior; cycle intensity is the full-sample Cycling Ratio.
Varying cycle indicator and intensity are the date-level versions of those two variables. Standard errors in parenthesis.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Table A.9: Price restoration and changes in cost. New York gasoline futures.
Full sample Cycling markets
∆costt > 0 0.013
∗∗∗ 0.020∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000)
∆costt−1 > 0 0.023
∗∗∗ 0.033∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000)
∆costt−2 > 0 0.005
∗∗∗ 0.008∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000)
Market trough=1 × ∆costt > 0=1 0.012∗∗∗ 0.016∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001)
Market trough=1 × ∆costt−1 > 0=1 0.032∗∗∗ 0.043∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001)




Week-Zip FE Yes Yes
Brand FE Yes Yes
City-dow FE Yes Yes
Note. Dependent variable: 1(station-level trough); the observation level is a cycling station-day combination. Stan-
dard errors in parenthesis. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
125
Figure A.7: Price reporting activity by day of the week.
Note. Plotted are the day-of-the-week fixed effects on reporting frequency from the estimation of Table 1.8.
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Table B.1: Aircraft utilization
Panel A: US Airways & America West
Distance Elapsed time Air time
After merger approval · UA -2.234∗∗∗ -0.250∗∗ -0.248∗∗∗
(0.742) (0.108) (0.094)
After combining of operations · UA 2.799∗∗ 0.342∗ 0.268
(1.331) (0.198) (0.171)
R2 0.2295 0.2060 0.2331
Observations 286,222 286,222 286,222
Ȳ 89.635 15.404 12.614
Panel B: Delta & Northwest
After merger approval · DN 1.983∗∗∗ 0.454∗∗∗ 0.347∗∗∗
(0.725) (0.100) (0.089)
After combining of operations · DN 1.332∗ 0.161 0.080
(0.702) (0.101) (0.087)
R2 0.2248 0.2075 0.2336
Observations 278,368 278,368 278,368
Ȳ 87.449 14.957 12.262
Panel C: United Airlines & Continental
After merger approval · UC -4.109∗∗∗ -0.605∗∗∗ -0.497∗∗∗
(0.550) (0.080) (0.070)
After combining of operations · UC 4.115∗∗∗ 0.547∗∗∗ 0.447∗∗∗
(0.880) (0.122) (0.110)
R2 0.2118 0.1903 0.2180
Observations 269,964 269,964 269,964
Ȳ 87.169 14.663 12.105
Notes: Standard errors clustered at the aircraft level in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. A unit of
observation is an aircraft–airline–month–year combination. The dependent variables are: monthly distance traveled
(in thousands of miles), monthly actual elapsed time (i.e., from departure to arrival, in thousands if minutes), and
monthly air time (i.e., from wheels off to wheels on, in thousands of minutes). All regressions include month–year
and airline fixed effects. See Section 2.4 for variable definitions and regression ranges.
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Table B.2: Number of aircraft
UA DN UC
After merger approval · merged -0.043 -0.042∗∗∗ -0.027∗
(0.029) (0.010) (0.014)
After combining of operations · merged -0.217∗∗∗ -0.015∗ -0.149∗∗∗
(0.026) (0.009) (0.015)
R2 0.9798 0.9920 0.9776
Observations 1,027 1,010 960
Ȳ 5.188 5.266 5.293
Note: Standard errors clustered at the aircraft level in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. A
unit of observation is an airline–month–year combination. The dependent variable is the monthly number of aircraft
used for at least one flight. All regressions include month–year and airline fixed effects. See Section 2.4 for variable
definitions and regression ranges.























































































US Airways America West Total
Notes: Authors’ calculations based on BTS data. Solid line: merger approval; dashed line: joint report of information
to the BTS, as reported in Table 2.1.
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Notes: Authors’ calculations based on BTS data. Solid line: merger approval; dashed line: joint report of information
to the BTS, as reported in Table 2.1.
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Notes: Authors’ calculations based on BTS data. Solid line: merger approval; dashed line: joint report of information
to the BTS, as reported in Table 2.1.
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US Airways America West Total
Notes: Authors’ calculations based on BTS data. Solid line: merger approval; dashed line: joint report of information
to the BTS, as reported in Table 2.1.
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Notes: Authors’ calculations based on BTS data. Solid line: merger approval; dashed line: joint report of information
to the BTS, as reported in Table 2.1.
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Notes: Authors’ calculations based on BTS data. Solid line: merger approval; dashed line: joint report of information
to the BTS, as reported in Table 2.1.
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Table B.3: Results using the date of the integration of reservation systems as date
of combined operations.
Panel A: US Airways & America West
(I) (II)
After date of merger approval * UA -0.405∗∗∗ -0.575∗∗∗
(0.063) (0.061)





Panel B: Delta & Northwest
After date of merger approval * DN 0.307∗∗∗ 0.095
(0.081) (0.079)





Panel C: United Airlines & Continental
After date of merger approval * UC 0.541∗∗∗ 0.039
(0.061) (0.050)





Panel D: All mergers
After date of merger approval * merged 0.213∗∗∗ -0.097∗∗∗
(0.035) (0.035)





Note: Standard errors clustered at the route level in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. A unit
of observation is an individual flight. The dependent variable is carrier delay (min.) as defined in Section 1.3. All
regressions include flight code and month–year fixed effects, as defined in Section 2.4. The coefficients reported in




c from equation (2.4) with m = UA,
DN , UC, and {UA,DN,UC} for Panels A, B, C, and D, respectively. See Section 2.4 for variable definitions and
regression ranges.
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Table B.4: Other measures of quality as outcome variable.




After merger approval · UA -0.095 0.464
(0.278) (0.756)





Panel B: Delta & Northwest
After merger approval · DN 0.310∗∗∗ 1.197∗∗∗
(0.116) (0.355)





Panel C: United Airlines & Continental
After merger approval · UC 0.485∗∗∗ 0.251
(0.092) (0.168)





Panel D: All mergers
After merger approval · merged 0.468∗∗∗ 1.201∗∗∗
(0.069) (0.169)





Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. A unit of observation is an
airline–month–year combination. The dependent variables are indicated in column heads. All regressions include
airline and month–year fixed effects. The reported coefficients are βms and β
m
c from equation (2.4) with m = UA,
DN , UC, and {UA,DN,UC} for Panels A, B, C, and D, respectively. See Section 2.4 for variable definitions and
regression ranges.
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Table B.5: Other measures of on-time performance as outcome variable by merger.
Panel A: US Airways & America West
Carrier delay Travel Carrier Late
(max.) time canceled aircraft
After approval * UA -1.019∗∗∗ -2.284∗∗∗ -0.002∗∗∗ -0.795∗∗∗
(0.082) (0.232) (0.001) (0.095)
After comb. op. * UA 0.751∗∗∗ 2.133∗∗∗ 0.002∗∗ 0.475∗∗∗
(0.081) (0.241) (0.001) (0.112)
R2 0.0551 0.8319 0.0474 0.1266
Observations 34,830,532 34,830,532 35,582,521 34,830,532
Ȳ 4.774 135.157 0.008 4.346
Panel B: Delta & Northwest
After approval * DN -0.034 1.995∗∗∗ -0.001 0.164
(0.083) (0.234) (0.000) (0.100)
After comb. op. * DN 0.283∗∗∗ 1.769∗∗∗ 0.002∗∗∗ 0.710∗∗∗
(0.064) (0.178) (0.000) (0.072)
R2 0.0534 0.8247 0.0503 0.1148
Observations 32,406,052 32,406,051 33,095,196 32,406,051
Ȳ 4.631 136.455 0.007 4.389
Panel C: United Airlines & Continental
After approval * UC 0.063 -0.629∗∗∗ -0.003∗∗∗ -0.570∗∗∗
(0.055) (0.176) (0.000) (0.070)
After comb. op. * UC 1.082∗∗∗ 4.574∗∗∗ 0.004∗∗∗ 1.119∗∗∗
(0.097) (0.304) (0.000) (0.079)
R2 0.0481 0.8316 0.0514 0.1080
Observations 30,398,565 30,398,564 30,955,284 30,398,564
Ȳ 4.305 136.647 0.006 4.129
Note: Standard errors clustered at the route level in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. A unit of
observation is an individual flight. The dependent variables are indicated in column heads (see definitions in Section
1.3). All regressions include flight code and date–destination fixed effects, as defined in Section 2.4. The coefficients
reported are βms and β
m
c from equation (2.4) with m = UA, DN , and UC for Panels A, B, and C, respectively. See
Section 2.4 for variable definitions and regression ranges.
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